Creating Alternatives: Refugee Relief and Local Development in Western Tanzania

Beth Elise Whitaker

Between April and July 1994, the plight of Rwandan refugees made international headlines as half a million people crossed the border into northwestern Tanzania. This followed a less publicized influx of nearly 300,000 Burundi refugees in late 1993. Subsequently, Tanzania received thousands of refugees from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) in late 1996. In total, nearly 1.3 million people sought refuge in western Tanzania between 1993 and 1999. This massive influx of refugees from neighboring countries was not an entirely new experience for Tanzanians living in the area, however. There was a long history of movement and interaction among peoples and polities in the region, including regular flows of migrants and refugees. In the post-colonial era, conflicts in Rwanda (1959-62), Burundi (1972-73), and Zaire/DRC (late 1960s), and continuing political instability at other times, resulted in frequent refugee influxes to camps and settlements in western Tanzania.

Nevertheless, the post-1993 refugee migrations were different from earlier ones in three important ways. The first was their sheer magnitude. Between 1993 and 1999, Tanzania received more than three times as many refugees as it had received in the previous 32 years. Second, unlike historical population flows, these refugees were concentrated in several large camps, placing new stresses on ecological and environmental resources. The third difference was the scale of the international response. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a multitude of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) established massive relief programs to address the needs of refugees and, in some cases, local hosts. Once the dust settled, the refugee relief operation in the Great Lakes region cost the international community upwards of one million dollars each day. This chapter explores the shift of these international actors from an exclusive focus on emergency relief for refugees to a growing concern about rehabilitation and development in Tanzanian host communities.

Since the 1980s, refugee aid and development (RAD) theories have called for strategies linking refugee relief programs with local economic development policies. Yet, host populations continued to be neglected as subjects of analysis and assistance. This neglect led international initiatives like the second International Conference on
Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) in 1984 to assert that refugee assistance should be development-oriented and should take into account host population needs. Nevertheless, a number of factors have impeded effective integration of refugee aid and development policies, including lack of support in donor and host countries, weak coordination between refugee and development bureaucracies, and difficulties integrating increasing numbers of refugees into development plans.³

While RAD theories managed to draw attention to the situation of host populations, they were based on the fundamental assumption that refugees represent a problem or a burden, rather than an opportunity.⁴ Recently, it has been recognized that refugee migrations bring both costs and benefits to host countries.⁵ Refugees generally impose a burden on local economic infrastructure, environment, and resources. Refugees can also benefit hosts, though, by providing cheap labor to local producers, expanding consumer markets for local goods, and justifying increased foreign aid. Thus, the reception of refugees can at times be seen as part of a government's broader development plan.⁶

In western Tanzania, the sudden presence of refugees, aid workers, and relief resources significantly affected ongoing processes of development in host communities. The changing opportunities created by the refugee situation varied over time.⁷ In general, Tanzanian communities were more negatively affected during the emergency stage, that is, during the refugee influx and the first few months of their presence. In border areas, Tanzanian villagers assisted incoming refugees with food, shelter, and medical care for several weeks until the arrival of humanitarian relief organizations. Subsequently, refugees were transferred to large, concentrated camps where they received regular assistance from the international community. The operation then moved into the care and maintenance stage, when a new type of normalcy emerged. Camp-based NGOs initiated projects in Tanzanian communities, villagers and refugees interacted in business and agricultural production, and as a result many hosts were able to benefit from the situation. Later, the operation moved into another stage as the Tanzanian government sought to increase its control, both over the movement of refugees and over the coordination of NGO activities. These stages of the relief operation and the implications for local development are discussed in turn in the following sections.
1994 to early 1995: Emergency Stage

The massive influx of refugees from Burundi in late 1993 and Rwanda in early 1994 put an initial strain on local infrastructure and development resources due to the population increase. Sanitation was a particular problem when refugees first arrived. Before the construction of pit latrines throughout the camps, refugees wandered off to open spaces or used the latrines of local hosts. As a result, water sources were polluted and diseases afflicted both refugees and Tanzanians. Food security was also compromised, as local food supplies were not enough to feed both host communities and refugee populations. Existing infrastructure in western Tanzania was inadequate to meet the drastically increased demand during the emergency stage of the operation. Roads were destroyed by heavy trucks carrying relief supplies to the refugee camps. Local health facilities did not have enough drugs, beds, or doctors to serve both refugees and hosts. Schools in border areas were destroyed by refugees looking for places to sleep. During the emergency period, therefore, local long-term development activities were largely suspended as hosts and government officials struggled to meet the basic needs of refugees.

In response to the refugee influx, international NGOs also flooded into western Tanzania. As the primary international organization responsible for refugee assistance and protection, UNHCR awarded contracts to many of these NGOs (known as implementing partners) and coordinated their relief efforts. At first, the refugee operation was operated primarily out of Nairobi, Kenya where many organizations had regional offices which supported similar relief programs in Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan. From Nairobi, agencies were able to deploy personnel and relief supplies rapidly to the region. Over the ensuing months, however, the Government of Tanzania asserted that goods, supplies, and especially expatriate staff were required to pass through appropriate permit and immigration processes in Tanzania. By late 1994, aid agencies were supporting their refugee programs in western Tanzania from offices in the country’s largest city, Dar es Salaam. Supply pipelines were established within Tanzania, although some continued to operate through Kenya and Uganda. NGO operations throughout this period focused almost exclusively on providing emergency food and relief supplies to refugees in the newly-established camps. With the exception of a few limited efforts to mitigate the negative effects of the refugee presence, international agencies largely ignored the rehabilitation and development needs of local Tanzanian communities.
Relations between Tanzanian hosts, especially government officials, and expatriate staff of international relief organizations were strained during the emergency phase. International NGOs entered the area and started their relief operations with little regard to local government institutions. As one district official complained, “NGOs came in during the emergency and just started doing things without going through the proper channels.” There was very little coordination between NGOs and local structures. Even once the relief operation was established, it was coordinated primarily by UNHCR through field offices in each district. Meetings were held regularly with implementing NGOs, and government officials were sometimes—but not always—invited to participate. The international organizations seemed to have their own program for the refugees and did not discuss plans with civil servants in appropriate government departments. There was also little appreciation of the problems faced by hosts, and NGOs worked almost exclusively with the refugees. This situation caused a degree of distrust and hostility between expatriates and host government officials, as it has done in other refugee operations.8

The influx of refugees and relief resources into western Tanzania also contributed to the emergence of new actors. A multitude of NGOs were established by local elites during this period, and existing NGOs sought to expand their operations. In Karagwe district, for example, there were two local NGOs implementing development activities in 1993; by 1997 there were more than eight.9 These NGOs sought to tap into incoming resources associated with the refugee operation. As is often the case in host countries, however, UNHCR was hesitant to grant contracts to local NGOs as implementing partners in the relief operation.10 Tanzanian NGOs did not have experience in emergency work and were not trusted to manage finances. As a result, leaders of local NGOs felt shunned by their international counterparts. According to the executive director of one organization,

> When the international NGOs came in 1994, they didn’t want any local NGOs to get involved in relief services. We made some proposals which were took to them, but found that the door was bolted. In interagency meetings, the international NGOs tried to maneuver to eliminate local NGOs. ...Instead of wanting to raise the capacity of local NGOs, they wanted to work in competition with us.

Local NGOs in western Tanzania were thus largely excluded from participating in the refugee relief operation, which remained under the control of international actors.
During the emergency stage immediately following the refugee influx, therefore, international organizations concentrated on the needs of refugees over local hosts, relief efforts were coordinated by international actors with little input from government officials, and local NGOs were excluded from the refugee operation. The limited attention of international actors to Tanzanian concerns combined with the increased competition for local resources associated with the refugee presence to further threaten development opportunities in host communities. Tanzanians struggled to maintain access to even the most basic resources in the local context. Although there were some opportunities for increased trade and business activity due to the expansion of the market, local development efforts were largely stalled as a result of the refugee situation during this period. Near the end of 1994, one study found that the impact of the refugees was overwhelmingly negative: “virtually no external contributions... have been made [to assist Tanzanian villages] despite a rather numerous flow of agency observers.”

Thus, at the time, the refugee presence in western Tanzania was viewed as a significant burden to host communities.

**Early 1995 to late 1996: Care and Maintenance Stage**

At a conference in Dar es Salaam in December 1994, the Government of Tanzania appealed to the international community to provide funding for the mitigation and alleviation of negative effects of the refugee presence in western Tanzania. The government and donors made a deliberate decision that they would not compensate hosts individually for damage related to the refugee presence. Instead, they would pursue a social compensation approach to benefit host communities as a whole through rehabilitation of infrastructure and improvement of social services. The intent was to compensate Tanzanians collectively for the burden of hosting refugees, as well as to mitigate the refugee impact:

There is a perception among the local population that the refugees are better cared for and enjoying a higher standard of living than the indigenous Tanzanians in the area. There is therefore a likelihood of social friction between the two populations. To forestall this and the drop in earnings which would otherwise occur when the refugees eventually leave, it is essential that the indigenous population is ‘compensated’ and their lot improved so that they can continue to accept the presence of refugees in their neighbourhood.
This represents a common argument used to justify the integration of host communities into relief operations. The “efficiency claim”\textsuperscript{13} posits that hosts must be made to view the refugee presence as creating positive opportunities so that they do not disrupt the relief effort. A second “fairness claim”\textsuperscript{14} asserts that local populations should be assisted because the refugee presence could lead to the further impoverishment of hosts, particularly poorer ones.\textsuperscript{15} This overall approach seeks to alleviate the plight of refugees and local hosts, despite UNHCR’s narrow mandate to concern itself exclusively with the protection and assistance of refugees.\textsuperscript{16}

Donors responded to government requests and pledged nearly $42 million of support for rehabilitation projects in host communities. Throughout western Tanzania between 1994 and 1997, more than 50 primary schools and 20 dispensaries were rehabilitated, 4 district hospitals were expanded, at least 120 water systems were improved or installed, a community center was constructed, and several teacher resource centers were built. In addition, as of June 1998, there were plans to rehabilitate 20 more schools and 10 dispensaries and to upgrade several town water and electrical systems. Long-neglected infrastructure was upgraded with minimal contribution from communities. Implementing NGOs usually provided materials which were not available locally, and hired refugee laborers to complete construction. Schools were given teaching and learning materials, health workers were trained, and dispensaries were given medical equipment and drugs. Donors also invested large sums to upgrade transportation infrastructure throughout the area. In Kagera region, more than $15 million went toward the rehabilitation of main and feeder roads, airstrips, and telecommunications infrastructure; in Kigoma region, donor-funded rehabilitation of the main road and feeder roads began in late 1998.

Though intended primarily for the refugees, donor-funded services in the camps also benefited Tanzanians living in nearby communities. Prior to the refugee influx, the government had introduced a cost-sharing program requiring Tanzanians to pay a portion of their health care costs, which until then had been free. Transportation to hospitals was difficult to find and sick people would sometimes die along the way. At refugee health facilities, though, Tanzanians were eventually provided services free of charge.\textsuperscript{17} When a medical problem was too severe to be handled at camp hospitals, refugees and Tanzanians alike were transported to district hospitals. Tanzanians in villages near the camps also collected water at taps set up in the camps and used milling machines there to
grind dried maize which they purchased from refugees. In addition, donors funded the construction of new police stations and the deployment of additional police officers in an effort to increase security in and around the camps, where theft and other crimes were common.

International donors therefore funded a variety of relief and development projects in host communities in western Tanzania. Many donors were already active in Tanzania before 1993 and managed to re-program their allocated funds to refugee-affected areas after the influx. According to the director of one local NGO, donors and international NGOs had refused to support projects in his district prior to the refugee influx, claiming that the area was outside their zones of operation. After the refugees arrived, however, “those organizations bought their own tickets to come here.” Many international NGOs implemented development projects in districts where they would not otherwise have been active in response to the refugee situation. Even so, a few organizations which were already operating in western Tanzania shifted their projects to other villages in order to avoid the congestion of NGOs immediately around the refugee camps.

As international NGOs moved beyond relief work and initiated development projects within host communities, officials expected that their efforts would be more closely coordinated with government departments. But while international NGOs often consulted government officials to identify villages most in need of assistance and priority areas of operation, projects were designed for the most part by expatriate staff themselves based on considerations such as organizational expertise, their understanding of local needs (sometimes identified through participatory research), and the availability of donor funds. International NGOs implemented the projects directly in local villages, and generally did not involve government staff. In addition, there was virtually no direct financing to the government itself for project implementation. Donors seemingly preferred to have NGOs as their implementing partners rather than government departments, thus creating the perception that there were two separate structures within the local context.

As time went on, relations between the international relief community and local hosts improved. The situation started to change in early 1995, when the first district-level coordination meetings were held. In most districts, the impetus for these meetings came from a few local leaders and specific representatives of the aid community. Coordination efforts were thus largely actor-centered and were not institutionalized across the districts.
Through such meetings, local government officials had the opportunity to present hosts’ complaints about water, firewood, and other refugee-related problems. Officials quickly learned the lingo which would assist them in their fund-raising efforts, and their project proposals included trendy terms such as “capacity building,” “sustainability,” and “refugee-affected areas.” UNHCR and NGO representatives started to pay increased attention to host population needs, and relations with district government staff improved. Once international NGOs initiated assistance projects in host communities, appreciation and respect for these organizations amongst the local population increased. In focus group discussions conducted as part of the research, nearly 40% of the groups ranked NGO projects in local communities as the single most important benefit of the refugee presence.

Throughout this period, government officials and leaders of local NGOs pressed UNHCR and international NGOs for greater Tanzanian involvement in the relief operation. They argued that such an approach would build the capacity of local organizations to deal with emergency situations in the future and to manage their development projects. In addition to coordinating more closely with government departments, international NGOs were encouraged to sub-contract parts of their work to Tanzanian groups. By the end of 1995, UNHCR offered contracts directly to local NGOs, at first on a trial basis and then for longer periods. In at least one district, this greater willingness to contract with local NGOs was related to a shift in expatriate personnel. With the successful completion of these contracts, certain local NGOs earned reputations as effective implementing partners. After completing the rehabilitation of several former refugee camps, for example, one local NGO based in Karagwe district was recruited by UNHCR to do more relief work further south in Kigoma region. Tanzanian organizations thus came to play an increasing role in the refugee relief effort and gained useful project management experience.

During the care and maintenance stage, therefore, the refugee relief operation allowed more positive opportunities to emerge for local hosts. Food security improved when the food pipeline became operational and when local production increased (with the help of refugee labor). A large trading network in food and household items developed between refugees and hosts. The construction of water systems in the refugee camps and the rehabilitation of local water schemes reduced competition for local water sources. Donors also contributed to the rehabilitation of roads, schools, and health facilities and the construction of hospitals in the camps. Local infrastructure was thus progressively
upgraded to meet the new level of demand. In addition, relief and development activities were increasingly coordinated with government officials and implemented through Tanzanian organizations. The participation of Tanzanians in the relief effort reduced tensions between international and local actors and allowed the latter to benefit from the refugee situation. By 1997, government documents recognized that there had been significant positive benefits for host communities in western Tanzania.¹⁸

Nevertheless, despite increased international attention to local needs, the Tanzanian government was still criticized for failing to secure more donor assistance for projects in refugee-hosting communities. As one senior-ranking official argued,

The government at the national level has not been kali [strict, harsh] with UNHCR. The government should have demanded more. The national government didn’t pressure donors hard enough on getting development projects for locals.

UNHCR staff members compared the situation in western Tanzania to that in Malawi, where the government used the presence of 1.3 million Mozambican refugees to demand relief and development projects for local hosts. Many refugees there were integrated into local villages, and much of the relief program was operated by the government. Projects were geographically distributed in such a way that benefits accrued to local Malawians. Schools were built to government standards, water systems were developed, and tarmac roads were constructed—all as a price for the refugees staying there. In contrast, as one aid worker observed, the Tanzanian government “figured out very late that there [were] money and advantages to be gained.” The implication was that the Government of Tanzania could potentially have demanded (and received) more from international donors in terms of relief and development projects for host communities.

**Late 1996 through 1998: Changing Dynamics and Policies**

Starting in late 1996, the Government of Tanzania increasingly sought to control the activities and movement of refugees within its borders. In December 1996, the government initiated a repatriation exercise of all Rwandan refugees during which the military was used. In 1997 and 1998, Tanzanian authorities rounded up refugees from local villages and placed greater restrictions on those in the camps. Controls were tightened on movement in and out of the camps, and interaction between refugees and hosts was limited. The various factors behind this shift in government refugee policy are
discussed at length elsewhere, although regional security considerations were a primary concern. Several human rights organizations were sharply critical of the policy shift, but international NGOs working in the area remained largely silent. UNHCR provided funding and logistical support for the repatriation exercise, but subsequently criticized the round-up operation as having violated principles of refugee protection. In this changing context, the government sought to assume greater control over the relief and development work of international organizations.

Ever since the donor conference in late 1994, the Government of Tanzania had asked the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to support a new unit within the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to coordinate and implement the Refugee Affected Areas Rehabilitation Programme. The aim of this program was to coordinate the efforts of government departments and international agencies to provide relief and development services to host communities. It was not until late 1996, however, that the structures of the UNDP/PMO program at the central government level sought to become active in coordination efforts at the district level. Coordination meetings were organized by the program, and donors and NGOs were asked to provide summaries of their activities in local communities, including the nature of the projects, their time frames, and their sources of funding. Organizers sought to encourage communication between NGOs/donors and government departments so that the rehabilitation effort would be both comprehensive and widespread, and in order to avoid duplication.

While observers applauded the central government’s effort at greater coordination on the whole, the specific timing and approach raised concerns both among international agencies and within local government departments. Representatives of international agencies wondered why this overarching system of coordination had come so late in the process, after many were nearing the final stages of implementation in local rehabilitation projects. There were already rumors in late 1996 about a possible repatriation of Rwandan refugees, and many agencies in western Tanzania were hesitant to make further commitments there. Moreover, NGO representatives questioned the need for additional reporting requirements, as many were already producing periodic reports which they distributed to donors and government offices at the local and national levels. Finally, aid workers were concerned that organizers of the centralized UNDP/PMO program were seeking to take over existing coordination efforts at the local level in order to more closely control NGO activities.
The UNDP/PMO program generated the loudest complaints amongst local
government staff, however, because it established separate committees at the national,
regional, district, and even sectoral levels. The theory was that these various bodies
would coordinate with government departments and conform to local development plans.
In reality, they functioned quite independently of existing state structures:

The programme is said to be based on the principles of decentralisation and the
use of existing local capacities.... Practice on the ground does not seem to
conform with this principle. For example, even though the programme
emphasises the involvement of the district authorities, the major complaint we
received in all districts we visited was lack of communication between
UNDP/PMO offices established under this programme and the existing
government planning structures.  

This lack of communication caused some local officials to resent the new program, which
had originated at the central government level. In one district, government staff
determined that UNDP/PMO funding areas were not in line with their own priorities, and
prepared their own plan for which they sought funding directly from donors. A regional
official complained that the program, which enjoyed greater access to resources, was
“establishing a parallel planning structure instead of working through the existing one.”

Rather than resolving coordination matters by providing a link between government
structures and international agencies, therefore, the UNDP/PMO program essentially
created still another set of structures which sought to involve itself in local development
and rehabilitation.

During this period, the government also sought to further increase Tanzanian
involvement in the relief operation. During the 1996 repatriation of Rwandan refugees,
local NGOs were charged with assisting the refugees along the road while international
organizations were denied access to border areas. In 1998, a government directive in
Kasulu district required that all international NGOs seek local NGO partners for their
refugee activities by the end of the year, after which the operation was to be run primarily
by local organizations. The Government of Tanzania thus promoted “nationalization” of
the refugee operation. This policy had two underlying goals: capacity building and
control. By increasing Tanzanian involvement in the relief effort, the government sought
to build the capacity of local NGOs so that they could eventually take over the operation.
At the same time, nationalization gave the government greater control over relief efforts.
Through various political and patronage ties, Tanzanian authorities could more easily
influence and keep tabs on the activities of local NGOs. The fact that these directives toward nationalization were issued in the same period that the government developed a more restrictive refugee policy suggests that control was also an important goal.

Starting in late 1996, therefore, the Tanzanian government promoted stricter coordination of development projects under the centralized UNDP/PMO program and further nationalization of the refugee operation. Ironically, just as the government was asserting greater control over NGO relief and development activities, resources for such projects were declining. The level of funding available for local development projects had always paled in comparison to the funds available for emergency work. As one aid worker said, “Getting money for development is much slower than for relief.” His organization had submitted development proposals to donors nine months earlier and made little progress, but on emergency relief proposals they received immediate—and generally favorable—responses. By late 1996, though, even emergency funds were becoming difficult to obtain. UNHCR, which is entirely dependent upon voluntary contributions from member countries, found it increasingly difficult to raise necessary funds to support the refugee operation. The international spotlight had shifted its focus to humanitarian emergencies elsewhere, and the situation in central Africa moved into its shadows. In early 1998, UNHCR faced severe funding difficulties and forced its implementing partners to make 20% budget cuts. The first item to be cut by most agencies was the budget line for projects in host communities. Thus, the number of NGO projects in western Tanzania declined just as the government was seeking greater control over them.

Refugee Relief and Local Development

The sudden influx of refugees, aid workers, and relief resources into western Tanzania starting in late 1993 significantly affected development opportunities in host communities. In the months immediately following the refugee influx, international aid agencies concentrated their attention on the refugees and neglected the needs of local hosts. Tanzanian officials were not generally involved in coordinating relief efforts, and local NGOs were largely excluded from the operation. Once the operation moved beyond the emergency period and into the care and maintenance stage, donors began implementing rehabilitation and development projects in host communities. The
government played an increasing role in coordination efforts, particularly at the district level, and local NGOs were granted greater responsibility in the relief operation. In late 1996, the Government of Tanzania sought stricter coordination of NGO activities through a centralized structure and further nationalization of the refugee operation. At the same time, however, donor resources available for projects in western Tanzania declined, limiting the extent to which such changes could produce positive effects for local development.

The evolution of the relief operation in western Tanzania can be contrasted to the situation in Malawi in the early 1990s. After the influx of refugees from Mozambique, the Malawian government sought to prevent the proliferation of international NGOs and to entrust the relief operation to local agencies which it coopted. This approach constrained the emergence of an alternative structure of international NGOs and gave the government a dominant role in the relief operation. It was not until economic conditions necessitated further international involvement that a more conventional, externally-driven relief model came to prevail. In Tanzania, on the other hand, external actors dominated the relief and rehabilitation operation from the beginning. The government welcomed a multitude of international NGOs during the emergency stage of the refugee influx. It subsequently sought to achieve more control over the relief operation by establishing structures of coordination and increasing Tanzanian involvement. Over time, and in part due to these government efforts, international NGOs shifted from an exclusive focus on refugee relief to a growing concern about rehabilitation and development in host communities.

The nature of the relief operation in western Tanzania had several important implications for processes of socioeconomic development in host communities. First, international agencies became a sort of substitute for the government in certain areas of socioeconomic development. Donors concentrated their local development efforts within the sectors of education, health, infrastructure, and the environment. Due to the overall economic crisis and to recent budget cuts, the government found itself increasingly unable to sustain quality services within those sectors. That there was an alternative structure through which to access development resources was perhaps less significant than the fact that this alternative was more capable than its state counterpart to deliver on development promises, at least in the short run. Over time, the government sought to rein in these external actors by establishing coordination structures and by increasing the involvement of local groups. Even so, relief and development projects remained largely
in the hands of donor-funded organizations which were only narrowly accountable to the public interest.\textsuperscript{23}

Second, while international NGOs were actively encouraged to increase their involvement in socioeconomic development, the legal framework under which such organizations operated explicitly prevented them from being affiliated with any political parties or partisan groups. In other words, NGOs were invited to participate in economic and social development, but not in politics. By limiting the spheres in which NGOs could and could not get involved, the government effectively drew a line between development and politics. Development matters were treated as technical problems to be addressed by “experts”, rather than as inherently political issues. This approach effectively “depoliticized”\textsuperscript{24} development decisions by removing them from the tensions and negotiations of local politics. The eventual creation of yet another centralized structure to coordinate development activities in western Tanzania further distanced such decisions from their intended beneficiaries at the local level.

Finally, by nature and by design, NGO projects in host communities operated with limited time frames. Regardless of whether donors agreed to a one-, three-, or five-year project, funds would eventually run out and the international NGO would move on. Although projects provided significant benefits in the short term, therefore, the issue of sustainability concerned government officials. A senior government planner explained:

\begin{quote}
There was no concern about the project itself—no attention to its sustainability. They all will collapse after some time. And when people don’t see development happening the way it happened in the past, they won’t just be able to ask donors to give money. We can’t maintain this. ...In itself, the NGO projects are positive, ...but they are not sustainable by the government because we don’t have the resources. So [some people] liked these projects, but I am worried that this will create antagonism between the people and the government later on.
\end{quote}

There was a risk, then, that donor-funded projects would raise expectations within host communities to a level which could not be fulfilled by government structures after donor departure. To an extent, the presence of an alternative \textit{but temporary} structure for the provision of development resources may have created additional challenges for state-society relations over the long run. In the end, the Tanzanian case demonstrates that refugee relief operations can lead to donor-funded development projects in host communities. These projects are often designed by external actors and for limited periods
of time, however, limiting the extent to which they can facilitate long-term sustainable development. In many ways, it would seem, refugee relief and local development have yet to be effectively integrated.

1 This chapter is based on data collected through nearly two years of field research in western Tanzania from October 1996 to August 1998. Funding was provided by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Abroad Fellowship, a P.E.O. Scholar Award, and an Institute for the Study of World Politics Doctoral Dissertation Research Fellowship. The support of these institutions is gratefully acknowledged.
7 The effects of the refugee presence also varied significantly between specific host communities and among different social groups. For more on these variations, see Whitaker, *Disjunctured Boundaries*.
10 This was not true in several of the Burundian refugee camps established in early 1994, however, where the Tanzanian Red Cross Society played an important role.
14 Ibid.
When refugee hospitals were first built, some hosts were not granted immediate access to the facilities. After local leaders initiated negotiations between government officials and UNHCR, though, Tanzanians were provided free treatment at most camp hospitals.

See Whitaker, *Disjunctured Boundaries*.


