The Military and Intelligence Reform in Chile

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Abstract
For the past fourteen years, three successive Concertación governments have worked with varying degrees of success to advance civilian supremacy over the armed forces. This article will argue that the work of civilian governments to reform the military’s role in intelligence has proved only minimally successful in terms of expanding civilian authority and will offer a model for understanding the dynamics of intelligence reform. It employs three variables, based on the number of institutions involved in overseeing intelligence, the degree of presidential control, and whether military intelligence activities are overseen by the civilian government. Current reform efforts have led to the creation of an agency that does not advance civilian supremacy over the armed forces.

Resumen
Durante los últimos catorce años, tres gobiernos sucesivos de la Concertación han trabajado – con distinto grado de éxito – en avanzar en el control civil sobre las Fuerzas Armadas. Este artículo argumenta que el trabajo de los gobiernos civiles para reformar el rol militar en labores de inteligencia ha demostrado solo mínimos grados de éxito en términos de expandir la autoridad civil, y ofrece un modelo para entender las dinámicas de la reforma de inteligencia basado en el empleo de tres variables: el número de instituciones involucradas en supervisar la inteligencia, el grado de control presidencial, y como las actividades de inteligencia militar son supervisadas por el gobierno civil. Los actuales esfuerzos por reformar la inteligencia llevaron a la creación de una agencia que no implica un avance en el control civil sobre las fuerzas armadas.

Palabras clave: Chile, democracia, transición, inteligencia, fuerzas armadas.
For the past fourteen years, three successive Concertacion governments have worked with varying degrees of success to advance civilian supremacy over the armed forces. Although final passage has not yet occurred, the Senate vote in October 2004 for the elimination of designated senators and “inamovilidad” of military commanders in chief, as well as proposed reforms of the National Security Council, is a clear victory for democracy. Almost simultaneously, however, another reform in the area of intelligence was also taking place that was far less successful and received very little attention.

This article will argue that the work of civilian governments to reform the military’s role in intelligence has proved only minimally successful in terms of expanding civilian authority and will offer a model for understanding the dynamics of intelligence reform. It employs three variables, based on the number of institutions involved in overseeing intelligence, the degree of presidential control, and whether military intelligence activities are overseen by the civilian government. When addressing issues of high salience, especially when the military is unified, politicians’ disincentives to pursue reform increase dramatically, and the reform is far less likely to contribute significantly to civilian supremacy over the armed forces.

After the attacks of September 11, 2001 a renewed interest in intelligence gathering has emerged throughout Latin America as well as in the United States. More specifically, Latin American militaries and the United States government have called for greater scope in gathering intelligence on potential terrorists and in regional sharing of intelligence information, while Latin American governments have begun believing that intelligence agencies are necessary to fight “terrorism.” This makes intelligence reform a key issue in civil-military relations. In the Chilean case, the civilian government advocated the creation of the National Intelligence Agency (ANI) a few months after the attacks. It was approved in 2004, but would not challenge the autonomy of individual military intelligence organizations.
MILITARY INTERESTS

To understand the military’s response to civilian initiatives it is necessary to analyze the salience that the armed forces attach to specific issues. In the Chilean case, intelligence is highly salient, meaning that the military is less likely to accept a reduction in its role. As Zagorski has argued, “The more uniform the interest across the various sectors of the armed forces, the more likely the success of the armed forces’ action in defense of this interest.”

This appears to be true in Chile. Yet, there is another important factor as well, as civilian indifference plays an important role. Although the Concertación has discussed intelligence reform several times since 1990, the idea of reducing the military’s intelligence role has never been a central policy priority.

For the Chilean military, participation in intelligence has been a highly salient interest for many years. As in many Latin American countries, the armed forces created the country’s first intelligence agencies; in Chile, the army’s intelligence gathering dates back to 1891. The Cold War and then military government spurred the other branches to create their own (the navy in 1965; Carabineros in 1974; and Air Force in 1976).

In Chile and elsewhere in Latin America, intelligence very often entailed domestic surveillance of some type, which was deemed the best way to ensure that “la Patria” was endangered. During the Cold War, the widespread perception that Communism posed a threat to institutional order expanded the scope of the military’s role in intelligence gathering, though it did not increase significantly until the onset of the military regime in 1973. Much, if not most, of such efforts centered on the military’s own fellow citizens, as it tapped phones, opened mail, made arrests, conducted interrogations, and even killed prisoners. A mere decade after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the attacks on the United States reinforced the military’s view that its participation in intelligence was an essential element in the protection of vital national interests.

Civilian political leaders are well aware of the military’s keen interest in intelligence, as well as its resistance to decreasing or minimizing its role.

The result is that even when civilian governments embark on intelligence reform, they face significant obstacles to dismantling structures that the armed forces have considered central to the nation’s protection. These governments are seeking to promote civilian supremacy in the area of intelligence without eliminating the roots of military autonomy. Given disincentives the goal of civilian politicians will be to democratize as much as possible without risking military backlash. The possibility for such backlash increases as the salience the military attaches to each issue increases.  

The need for legal reform is especially noteworthy in the context of new threat perceptions after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In Chile, just as in the rest of Latin America, the result has been a “securitized” response. In practice, this means a prominent role for the armed forces as response to the potential for terrorist activity. In Latin America the use of the military in internal missions is not automatically a problem for democracy. A dilemma arises, however, when the military is engaged in an activity for which the legal scope of its action remains unreformed by civilian governments.

THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY

Many definitions of intelligence have been offered, but its core is information. This information, of course, can be gathered in many different ways (human intelligence, signal intelligence, etc.) and by different entities (police, military, domestic bureaus, etc.). In the law creating the ANI, Chilean lawmakers defined intelligence (in addition to counterintelligence) as the following:

Inteligencia: el proceso sistemático de recolección, evaluación y análisis de información, cuya finalidad es producir conocimiento útil para la toma de decisiones.

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4 Weeks, op. cit.
7 As one author notes, “I define intelligence in its broadest sense as information. None of the definitions I have seen work.” Kahn, David. 2001. “An Historical Theory of Intelligence.” Intelligence and National Security 16 (3), p. 79.
Contrainteligencia: aquella parte de la actividad de inteligencia cuya finalidad es detector, localizar y neutralizar las acciones de inteligencia desarrolladas por otros estados o por personas, organizaciones o grupos extranjeros, o por sus agentes locales, dirigidas contra la seguridad del Estado y la defensa nacional.  

Terms such as “conocimiento útil,” “neutralizar,” as well as “seguridad” and “defensa nacional” are all very broad, so the emphasis here is both on the degree to which the military participates in defining them and gathering information, and on how it is allowed to do so.

The vast literature on control over intelligence has focused primarily on consolidated democracies and the problems in the relationship between elected officials and intelligence services, while oversight over military activities is taken as a given. What such analyses do not address, therefore, is the simultaneous struggle to establish intelligence services while reducing the scope of military autonomy vis-à-vis elected officials.

To understand the specific dynamics of intelligence reform and the military, this article will build on Bar-Joseph’s model of “control systems” over intelligence, which outlines the variables of “means” and “participation.” Means refers to the manner in which intelligence is controlled, either personal (where intelligence agencies respond to the dictates of an individual, usually the president) or constitutional (where the agencies’ activities and reporting are grounded in law). Participation refers to whether intelligence is controlled by one branch of the government (unilateral) or more than one (multilateral). He concludes that intelligence intervention in politics is lowest when the outcome is constitutional-multilateral, and highest at personal-unilateral.

Since his work focuses on democracies (Great Britain, Israel, and the United States) his model does not account for the potential of nondemocratic military participation in intelligence. The analysis provides useful nuance for democracies, but since he lumps “most Third World countries” into a single category, there is no differentiation between them. In the Latin American context, the addition of the military’s role is essential, and so it is necessary to add a third variable, “Military,” for which there is either

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8 The text of the new law (Law 19.974) can be found at the website of the Chilean Senate (http://www.senado.cl).

“oversight” (military intelligence activities are accountable to elected civilian authorities) or “autonomy” (where activities are not accountable).

Table 1 shows the outcomes of different intelligence arrangements, with six different possible control systems. In dictatorships, the structure of control is personal-unilateral-autonomy, since the executive (in the Latin American context, usually a military officer) is perhaps answerable to a military elite, but not to any other institution. The most propitious for democracy is constitutional-multilateral, oversight, in which the binding rules exist, more than one institution has input, and military activities are overseen by elected authorities.

**Table 1**

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<tr>
<th>MEANS</th>
<th>Unilateral</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
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<td>Autonomy (Weak Control)</td>
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<td>Oversight (Highly Unlikely)</td>
<td>Oversight (Democratic Control)</td>
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<td>Constitutional</td>
<td>Autonomy (Weak Democratic Control)</td>
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<td>Oversight (Democratic Control)</td>
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<td>Control, Strong Executive)</td>
<td>Democratic Control</td>
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**Intelligence Reform in Chile**

The task of intelligence reform in the postauthoritarian era was made even more complicated by the authoritarian residue of former members of dictatorship-era intelligence organizations, both formal and informal. Pinochet named Colonel Manuel Contreras director of Chile’s secret police and intelligence agency, the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA). The DINA became infamous internationally for its repressive methods and its willingness to pursue “subversives” in any country (including the United States). Controlled personally by Pinochet, it was the epitome of military excesses and violation of individual liberties. After 1973, the military’s ideological war made intelligence a central element in General Augusto Pinochet’s hold on power. The structure was personal-unilateral-autonomy, since Pinochet himself directed intelligence activities without any further oversight, even from the other members of the ruling military junta.
The development of intelligence was also international. In 1975, Contreras held the first meeting of a new regional intelligence organization, named Condor (in honor of Chile’s national bird). The idea was to initiate “bilateral or multilateral contacts to exchange information on subversives.”10 The result was an intricate web of international coordination of repression that included the military intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Latin American intelligence had therefore become synonymous with state terrorism. The DINA was disbanded in 1977, and General Contreras stepped down, but a new organization, the National Center for Intelligence (CNI), continued for the duration of the dictatorship. Although less repressive than its predecessor, it maintained the army’s extensive vigilance over the country.

The weight of all this history would suggest that reform of military intelligence should have been a prominent way for Concertación politicians to gain popularity and votes. Expanding civilian control over intelligence could easily be framed as a critical and courageous measure to protect democracy from military interference. A proposal to eliminate military agencies could, furthermore, be touted as a money-saving measure. Politicians could potentially have provided voters with both moral and economic rationale for reform.

Reforming intelligence was, in fact, routinely part of Concertación platforms. The idea of creating a new intelligence agency had been floated several times since the transition from military rule was completed in 1990. For civilians, the goal was to centralize intelligence gathering in an institution that would be controlled by the president. In the absence of such an institution, each military branch had its own intelligence services, ultimately answerable only to the individual commander in chief. The military, however, was not amenable to adding civilian oversight. In the mid-1990s, there were even several cases of civilian government officials being spied on. In 1995 President Eduardo Frei sent a proposal to the Defense Commission of the Chamber of Deputies to centralize intelligence with more civilian control, but the military’s supporters ensured that it died in committee. The Concertación did not push vigorously for passage, so intelligence reform remained in the background for several more years.

DEBATING THE STRUCTURE OF THE ANI

The attacks on the United States sparked new interest in intelligence. The most prominent was a political initiative by Christian Democrats, supported by the armed forces, to legislate a new national intelligence agency that could gather information to counter terrorist activity. In early October 2001 Congress began debating the creation of the ANI.

A serious problem facing any reformer is the persistently decentralized nature of Chilean intelligence. Six autonomous organizations work with little formal connections to each other. Each branch of the armed forces (army, navy and air force) operates its own agency, as do the National Police, Investigations (which is the investigative arm of the police), and the Directorate of Public Security and Information. As a result, the armed forces as a whole are united in resisting reductions to their intelligence prerogatives.

The army’s Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército (DINE) has been the most implicated in spying on civilians. Former members of the CNI had filled its ranks, and in the early 1990s a special congressional committee heard testimony that problems with DINE were chronic and unresolved. Such problems persisted, usually involving spying on members of the executive or legislative branches. Democratic reform would require, if not eliminating the military agencies, then at least passing oversight legislation and placing a civilian in charge of them. Given the importance each military branch places on intelligence, no such reform has been on the table.

In November 2003, a failed intelligence operation in southern Chile highlighted again how little control civilians have over military activities. Two army officers broke into an Argentine consulate in southern Chile and were discovered photocopying documents. Although they were eventually arrested, they remained out of civilian hands and their activities remained military secrets. Military intelligence activities, even those that compromise foreign relations, are not subject to civilian oversight.

The new ANI was intended to replace the Dirección de Seguridad Pública e Informaciones (DISPI), created in 1993 under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior. DISPI’s function was simply to receive information and provide reports to the president about threats to public order. Proponents argued that the Chilean

11 Weeks op. cit., 80.
state would finally have an effective source of counterintelligence to deal with foreign spies operating on Chilean soil.¹³ This was of particular interest to the Carabineros (Chile’s National Police) who were charged with combating the transshipment of drugs, particularly in the north.

Throughout the debate over the agency’s creation, however, no challenge emerged to the existence of military intelligence agencies or their autonomy. Instead, the ANI would simply “coordinate” the activities of all six organisms (Article 4 refers to “el conjunto de organismos de inteligencia, independientes entre sí, funcionalmente coordinados”). Article 20 of the law explicitly states that “La inteligencia militar es una función que corresponde exclusivamente a los servicios de inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas” while Article 21 states that the objectives of those services “serán fijados por las comandancias en jefe respectedas, de acuerdo con los criterios de la política de defensa nacional, fijados por el Ministro de Defensa Nacional.” To make the general point even more clear, Article 36 stipulates that “El control interno sera realizado por el Director o Jefe de cada organismo de inteligencia que integra el Sistema.” In other words, the army, navy, and air force will continue to determine what their intelligence services should do (though at least partially in consultation with the Defense Ministry), and the ANI will serve as a vehicle for sharing information.

In addition, the armed forces argued that the new agency would require a training program, for which they suggested military locations such as ANEPE.¹⁴ The military had been highly supportive of the ANI’s creation; the director of the army’s intelligence service called it a sign of “national growth” and should not be confused with “ghosts from the past.”¹⁵ Its support waned at times during the debate, especially when there were calls to diminish the agency’s operative capabilities. In May 2003, the debate in the Senate over its creation focused primarily on these possible operative functions. Members of the center-left “Concertación” coalition warned against internal surveillance, while the right expressed its confidence in the armed forces. Senator Baldo Prokurica, a member of the conservative Independent Democratic Union (UDI) party, tied closely to the military government, noted that concerns about spying should be allayed because of the law’s emphasis on the “internal control” of each military branch, which would ensure the protection of individual liberties.¹⁶ Ultimately the ability to conduct

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¹⁶ Senado de Chile, Sesión 49, Ordinaria, 13 May 2003.
internal surveillance was approved. No senators, regardless of party, questioned the current autonomy of those branches, which remained off the table. Military support, therefore, was retained.

The question of “internal control” is cloudy. In early December 2003, the Senate’s Defense Committee argued that the agency should be under the direct control of the president. This position ran counter to both the right and the armed forces, which did not want the possibility of the position becoming too close to the office of the president. Ultimately, the Concertación prevailed, as the director would be answerable to the president, and the appointment of that director would not be subject to congressional approval. Article 9 states that the director “será de la exclusiva confianza del Presidente de la República.”

The Defense Committee also voted to provide the ANI with the power to enact measures against terrorism and narcotrafficking. In addition, any such activity—such as tapping phone lines—involving “defense nacional” could be conducted by the intelligence services of the armed forces. Permission would be required from an Appellate Court, but the armed forces successfully lobbied to allow a military judge to grant the same permission.

The scope of potential activities is very broad, and is outlined in Article 24:

a) La intervención de las comunicaciones telefónicas, informáticas, radiales y de la correspondencia en cualquiera de sus formas;

b) La intervención de sistemas y redes informáticos;

c) La escucha y grabación electrónica incluyendo la audiovisual, y

d) La intervención de cualesquiera otros sistemas tecnológicos destinados a la transmisión, almacenamiento o procesamiento de comunicaciones o información.

Article 26 asserts that permission can be received through a “juez institucional” according to Book I, Title 2 of the Military Code of Justice, which covers military justice in time of peace. Article 16 of the Military Code of Justice clearly outlines “la jurisdicción permanente” of the respective military branches. Thus, if the director of a military intelligence service requests permission, the judge from that

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branch has full authority to make a decision about intrusive measures without civilian oversight. Further, Article 31 allows members of military intelligence services to hide their identity in order to infiltrate “organizaciones sospechosas de actividades criminales.” It corresponds solely to the head of each intelligence agency to decide what organizations should be deemed “suspicious.”

Ironically, the military wanted a more multilateral control system, arguing that unilateral control would foster abuse of presidential power, while President Ricardo Lagos pushed for unilateral. Congressional participation would be limited to an intelligence committee in the lower house, which could request reports on the service’s activities. Precisely how much information would be required was left vague, thus establishing “the mere formality” of control and “leaving in ignorance Senators and all citizens of the country.”19 Only after the law was passed did members of the Comisión de Defensa in the Cámara de Diputados introduce a new motion to increase congressional control over the agency.20

The structure of the ANI is therefore constitutional-unilateral-autonomy, where rules govern it, but it remains largely under the control of the president in the context of continued military autonomy. As such, it does not advance civilian supremacy over the armed forces. Indeed, the ANI currently appears to represent a suboptimal outcome for the process of democratization in Chile. It does not bring individual military intelligence services under civilian control; it raises suspicions among many with recent memories of the dictatorship’s use of intelligence for repression; and it does not provide for extensive democratic oversight.

INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW

The Chilean case has parallels to other countries in the Americas, including the United States.21 In Nicaragua, a new civilian agency was created in 1993, but the military continues to control intelligence gathering without civilian oversight.22 The Peruvian intelligence system has been reformed several times since President Alber-

21 For a good introduction to intelligence reform in Latin America, see Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas op. cit.
to Fujimori fled the country in 2000, but thus far all reforms have allowed for continued military autonomy. In Argentina, where the armed forces left power in a position of weakness, a civilian government passed a new intelligence law in 2001. The National Defense Law of 1988 prohibited the military from conducting internal surveillance, but the intelligence agencies of each military branch remained intact, and are under the direct control of their respective commanders in chief. These difficulties are echoed across the region where, with only a few exceptions (such as Costa Rica, which has no standing military), the armed forces have traditionally been able to maintain their own intelligence activities.

The same challenges exist in the United States. The 2004 report on terrorist attacks (The 9/11 Commission Report) included recommendations to establish a central intelligence organization that would take control of all intelligence agencies. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and National Security Agency (NSA), which have been under military control for fifty years, would be controlled by the National Intelligence Director instead of the Department of Defense. Although some members of Congress have embraced this proposal, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld testified that any change would lead to “inefficiencies.” Retired General William Odom, former head of the NSA, argued that the result would be “a big mess.” An important difference, of course, is that civilian supremacy over the military is much more firmly established in the United States than in Latin America, but losing control over intelligence gathering remains highly salient and, therefore, the military resists losing control over it.

CONCLUSION

In Chile, the military regime created highly autonomous military intelligence agencies that continue to elude civilian oversight, despite numerous examples of spying on government officials and even foreign consulates. Current reform efforts, spurred on by the aftershock of September 11, 2001, have led to the creation of an agency that does not advance

civilian supremacy over the armed forces. Even within the right and the armed forces there exists concern that the power the agency is granted should not be so tightly controlled by the executive with little congressional oversight. Utilizing the three variables, it is clearly constitutional-unilateral-autonomous.

One unfortunate result of political disincentives in the area of intelligence has been for many presidents and members of Congress not to enact truly democratizing reform. Intelligence remains a highly salient issue for all armed forces in the region, albeit for varying reasons. In Chile, the attacks of September 11, 2001 put intelligence back on the political agenda even in the absence of any domestic threat to public order, but politicians have yet to demonstrate concerted interest in not only reforming intelligence, but also democratizing it.

The failure of reform is especially notable given the successful measure in the Senate to increase civilian power over commanders in chief and the elimination of designated senators. The proposed elimination of authoritarian enclaves in these areas has occurred simultaneously with the codification of military prerogatives in intelligence. The military appears to be united in its belief that intelligence is central to national security, and as such represents a highly salient military interest. Yet in those other areas (such as the National Security Council) salient interests were also at stake, and the legislature was able to overcome resistance. An important area of research will be to analyze the differences of the issue areas, to uncover precisely why some could be reformed and others could not. As mentioned earlier, the indifference of civilian policy makers may play an important role in understanding the lack of civilian initiative.

A final conclusion can be drawn, namely that intelligence reform per se is not automatically beneficial to democratic civil-military relations. The reform itself must include several dimensions, taking absolute control out of the hands of the president, establishing legal guidelines for oversight, and establishing civilian authority over the activities of military intelligence. The new Chilean intelligence agency has not accomplished those objectives, and consequently does not contribute to greater civilian supremacy over the armed forces.

REFERENCES


