As South American dictatorships fade into the past, analyses regarding their military legacies have increasingly diverged and disagreed. The purpose of this article is to introduce a factor that has yet to be fully incorporated into these accounts, one that has usually been viewed as less useful in examining political transitions, namely historical military legacies. The study of the military's role in transitions has been hampered by an overemphasis on short-term factors, which in turn has resulted in unexpected empirical outcomes and the stalling of theory-building. Only analyses combining "mode of transition" and historical legacy will adequately explain the persistence of both military autonomy and civilian rule.

To say that history matters in politics seems a truism. Yet as South American dictatorships fade into the past, analyses regarding their military legacies have increasingly diverged and disagreed. Since the wave of transitions from authoritarian rule concluded in the early 1990s, scholars have been struggling to explain the diversity of political outcomes. With some exceptions, militaries have accepted elections of civilian officials and the seemingly chaotic process, so inimical to the military mindset, by which policy is made in a democratic system. Nonetheless, this acceptance has not been universal. While some countries have gained a measure of civil-military equilibrium and stability, others have suffered destabilizing coup attempts. Throughout the region, civilian policy makers have sought to pass laws limiting military autonomy, but with widely varying results. Analyses to explain the variation have run the gamut from game theory to voluntaristic accounts, from path dependency to historical institutional, often coming to opposite conclusions. The purpose of this article is to introduce a factor that has yet to be fully incorporated into these accounts, one that has usually been viewed as less useful in examining political transitions, namely historical military legacies.

An essential element of democracy is civilian supremacy over the armed forces. Although disagreement certainly exists about the definition of civilian
supremacy, considerable consensus has emerged regarding its central elements that incorporate several themes. The government must be able to formulate and conduct general policy without interference from the armed forces. It must also be able to define national defense in all respects, including having the final word on what issues merit the most attention, what the country’s goals should be, what strategies are most appropriate, and what the military’s proper role within that framework should be. In addition, the constitution, national law, and military codes must codify the subordinate position of the armed forces (see Agüero 1995).

The most enduring approach to political transitions has centered on transition “paths” or “modes.” The mode of transition refers to the specific nature of the political transition from military to civilian rule, referring primarily to the circumstances surrounding the authoritarian government’s departure and the installation of a new civilian-led government. The path dependent emphasis of this approach was intended to correct what had been viewed as an excessively voluntaristic literature (Karl 1990). For example, in their influential study O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) likened the transition process to a “multilayered chess game” with “almost infinite combinations and permutations” (66). Although groundbreaking, their study was not conducive to theory building. The shift toward transition modes provided insight into the immediate postauthoritarian period by explaining the relative bargaining power of civilians and the military, thereby demonstrating that the political actors in this “game” had limited options when making their moves. Various efforts have been made to define specific modes: Linz and Stepan (1996) outline four modes of transition: pact; defeat in war; regime termination not initiated by the regime itself—for example, a coup by a military faction, armed insurgency, mass uprising, or other means of regime collapse—and extrication by a hierarchically-led military, which refers to an officer corps that values a stable state, and therefore, initiates regime change if military rule appears to endanger that stability.

Events, however, have confounded analyses that emphasize the transition path for understanding civil-military relations. Militaries that left power in a position of strength have been forced to make concessions in areas hitherto believed virtually impossible—such as the successes of the Chilean judiciary and the creation of a Brazilian Defense Ministry over military protests—whereas militaries that left in a position of weakness, such as in Argentina and Bolivia, periodically caused serious problems for civilian governments and have retained significant autonomy. Meanwhile, countries such as Colombia and Venezuela that did not suffer military governments became the least
stable in the region. The mode of transition argument encounters difficulties when explaining the region as a whole.

Although analyses of the mode of transition contributed greatly to an understanding of events in the immediate postauthoritarian period, they have not proven nearly as effective at understanding outcomes a decade or more later. Countries in which civil-military institutions such as the Ministry of Defense, Congress, and the judicial system have been strengthened do not necessarily correspond to those in which civilians had relatively more bargaining power, and the opposite often holds as well. Relative bargaining power has shifted in ways for which previous models never accounted.

These empirical exceptions have already sparked a debate about whether the transition paradigm should be scrapped altogether. As Carothers (2002) argues, “It is necessary for democracy activists to move on to new frameworks, new debates, and perhaps eventually a new paradigm of political change—one suited to the landscape of today, not the lingering hopes of an earlier era” (20). There can be no doubt that the literature on transitions has fallen short, but the analysis here rests on the assumption that it can be improved and yield further insights.

To grasp these differences better, it is necessary to separate short-term versus long-term historical factors. For example, to what degree are short-term decisions during the transition constrained by long-term issues, such as the military’s proclivity to intervene and even past civilian support for such intervention? Only by combining long-term structural and short-term conjunctural factors is it possible to obtain a more nuanced view of civil-military relations years after a transition has occurred.

Understanding the military’s role in democratization is not simply a matter of highlighting the mode of transition and relative bargaining strength, but also of examining the degree to which civil-military institutional structures and the military’s political influences have historically been strong. Even in countries in which the military left power in a position of strength, efforts to democratize civil-military institutions have had positive effects when there has been no history of military autonomy. This study posits that the exceptions left unexplained by the mode of transition argument can in large part be attributed to civil-military historical factors that such analyses do not address.

Mode of Transition versus Historical Legacies

In both the conceptual and empirical literature on political transitions in Latin America, emphasis is placed on initial conditions or on the nature and
internal organization of the outgoing military regime. Variables have included the unity of the military, how coherent the military regime’s economic and political agenda was, or whether the government was civilianized or militarized (Agüero 1995; Arceneaux 2001). The basic argument is intuitive: when faced with a strong and unified military, civilians will encounter firm resistance to democratic reform, especially with regard to issues of importance to the armed forces. These issues include, but are not limited to the constitutional role of the military, its institutional integrity, formulation of military doctrine, combating internal subversion, and defining threats and strategic goals (Weeks 2003). Military leaders may organize public shows of force, emit either veiled or overt threats, or simply refuse orders. Conversely, if the military leaves power in a weakened condition, this resistance will either not materialize to the same degree, or it will be viewed widely as an empty threat.

As exceptions have increased over time, however, it has become apparent that although useful, these analyses have shortcomings, especially since they do not address the connection between the transition dynamics of the present and the military’s role in the past. The specific effects of political learning and historical legacy have only sporadically been introduced into the literature on democratization. As Pridham (2000) notes, there is a tendency to view new democracies as having been “born of immaculate conception” (37). Political actors must deal with many historical issues even as they navigate through uncertainty, yet the transition literature often downplays or ignores the obstacles that historical legacies can pose. As a result, studies of Latin American military history and Latin American military transitions tend to dismiss each other. Typical of much of the literature, Karl and Schmitter (1991, 272) admit that “historically-created structures” engender “confining conditions” for decision-makers during the transition from military rule, yet these conditions are neither specified nor incorporated into their analysis of transition modes. In some cases, neither history nor prior regime type is even addressed (Munck and Leff 1997).

Nonetheless, a number of studies on military historical legacies exist. For example, Loveman (1999) details the strong continuity of military beliefs and doctrine in Latin America dating back even to the pre-independence period. The creation and subsequent defense of la Patria, the fatherland, has been the central concern of militaries throughout the region for hundreds of years. Long-held notions of the venality and incompetence of politicians is also prevalent, and when combined with the perceived danger to the integrity of la patria, they have prompted militaries to topple civilian governments. Describing the writings of officers in military journals over decades,
Nunn (1992) sees strong continuities, so that even as military governments disappeared, militarism did not. He writes, "Future observers would do well to bear in mind that most Latin American armies have assigned (sometimes self-assigned) national security roles that now fairly oblige them to act internally" (Nunn 1992, 268).

An extensive body of literature on military intervention and civilian support for it exists that, indeed, is much too large to do more than summarize here. To begin his discussion of the military and politics in Latin America, Fitch (1998) outlines the situation concisely: "The military has traditionally been a central force in Latin American politics" (3). Officers dominated the nineteenth century, and even in the last 50 years, every South American country has experienced military rule at some point. Tremendous differences between countries exist, however, so that whereas Bolivian generals fought amongst themselves and caballed with civilian factions, Uruguayans celebrated many successive years of peaceful presidential elections. Any attempt to explain transitions must take these differences into account.

This category of support for intervention also includes the strengths and weaknesses of civil-military institutions. Overall, congressional oversight and the general influence of Congress over the armed forces has been minimal in South America, and so we would not expect it to appear dramatically, even within the context of a favorable transition path. Other institutions, however, such as the Ministry of Defense, have varying histories across the region; and of course this variation is linked very closely to the degree of military intervention.

Finally, we should recognize the issue of constitutional-legal legacies that encourage or at least allow for military influence and perhaps even direct intervention. At the time of the political transitions in South America, most countries retained national security legislation that granted wide powers to the armed forces (Loveman 1994). In some cases, these laws had been on the books since the nineteenth century. In many countries, they have not been abolished or even amended, and in many cases the military has actively been trying to maintain and enlarge these legal prerogatives (Pereira and Davis 2000). Their ability to do so has a tremendous impact on the democratization process, since without constitutional-legal reform, efforts to advance civilian supremacy over the military will simply stall. Unfortunately, even in countries that underwent transitions favorable to civilian authority, postauthoritarian governments have been largely unable to enact reform.

In response to those who are skeptical of the continued effects of history, Loveman (2001) also writes, "Strategic choice never takes place in a vacuum.
Neither history nor choice, neither institutions nor social structure, alone determines the changing configuration of civil-military relations" (270). An exclusive focus on the recent paths has not yielded a full enough view of the political arena in the postauthoritarian era.

There are also, of course, analytical cracks in overly broad historical generalizations. In particular, an exclusively long-term perspective precludes an understanding of specific moments of political change. If the military’s beliefs about the incompetence of politicians are constant, then how did transitions ever occur in the first place? Hunter (2001) argues that historical explanations are incapable of ”explaining the immediate impetus or impulse driving politicians’ behavior, especially conduct that overtly challenges the armed forces” (51). Nonetheless, the empirical exceptions to the rule demonstrate that such an assertion does not adequately acknowledge how history has a direct impact on the decisions politicians make.

**Modes of Transition in South America**

Through an examination of specific countries, the explanatory power of combining mode of transition with historical legacy becomes clearer, and the cases in South America provide variation that will allow us to come to conclusions about the historical factor. This study uses three broad categories in its examination: countries that underwent transitions more favorable to democracy, for example, those that experienced defeats in war or regime termination; those where transitions were less favorable, as with those that went through extrication or pact; and those that were not emerging from authoritarian rule.

**Defeat in War or Regime Termination**

Of the four main transition modes, defeats in war and regime extrication offer the most promise for advances in civilian authority. In the wake of a military defeat of an authoritarian regime, civilians can step into a political vacuum and seize the opportunity to make reforms that might be impossible if the armed forces were not in a position of weakness. Regime termination refers to an authoritarian government that has found itself compelled to leave power through some combination of internal factions and low domestic support. In both situations, the transition literature would expect opportunities for civilian supremacy to expand. For example, the mode of transition thesis posited that the 1983 transition in Argentina was an example of a combination of collapse and defeat in war, given the rapid implosion of the *junta* after a disastrous
war with Great Britain in 1982; conflicts between military factions; economic mismanagement; and widespread opposition born of brutal repression. That would lead us to expect almost complete civilian control over the armed forces despite a history of repeated military intervention, yet success in extending civilian supremacy in Argentina has been mixed. Pion-Berlin (1997) argues that Argentina has experienced important democratic advances, such as control over military budgets and a reduction of the military's activities in the country. Yet he also argues that historically the Ministry of Defense was unable to assert itself and the judicial system was not effective in prosecuting the many human rights cases that the first postauthoritarian government sought. Twenty years after the transition, the efforts to prosecute remain uneven. Although successes have occurred, including convictions of high ranking officers of the military dictatorship, they are less than a "collapse" mode would predict, and have been accompanied by the intimidation of judges (McSherry 2000). As Stanley (2001) points out, "The unfolding dynamic on this [human rights] issue appears to be conditioned less by electoral politics than by the corporate interests of the military and the government's perception that it can ignore these interests only at its peril" (80).

In addition, postauthoritarian governments in Argentina have been unsuccessful in the areas of doctrine and reform of the national defense structure (Pion-Berlin 2001). Although some elements of the military's ability to intervene in internal affairs were curtailed, others were untouched. The Argentine military's historically strong position has served to slow the pace of reform. Its concerns cannot be ignored by civilian policy makers.

In Bolivia, we would expect civilian advances and greater strides toward civilian supremacy and democratization, since the transition was initiated as a result of factions within the armed forces which had brought the military to the brink of institutional breakdown. Nonetheless, military intervention had been the norm since the early 1930s, culminating in the period of military rule that lasted from 1964 to 1982. The military remained behind the scenes after the transition and gradually stepped back into the limelight as a result of the militarization of the war on drug trafficking (Whitehead 2001).

In the postauthoritarian period, civilian governments in Bolivia were unable to enact military reform, and so the armed forces found it relatively easy to remain autonomous and largely free from civilian oversight. Although this situation has not meant overt intervention—Bolivia has experienced 20 years of elections—it has meant that the military aspect of democratization has long since stalled. Fearing military reaction, civilians did not encroach on military affairs despite favorable conditions in the immediate postauthoritarian period.
Paraguay is an interesting case because despite a transition in 1989 characterized by the collapse of a dictatorship no predictions were made of a decrease of military influence. In part, this is due to the military’s own role in forcing out dictator Alfredo Stroessner. However, Paraguayan historical military legacies have made optimism impossible. The country has the least experience with democracy in South America, with endemic corruption, military plotting, and no historical examples of strong civil-military institutions. Retired army general Lino Oviedo orchestrated a failed coup attempt in 1996, and in 1997 he won the presidential primary of the Colorado Party. Although ultimately imprisoned for the attempt to overthrow the government, he was released from prison by a sympathetic president and now resides under arrest in Brazil. Given the high level of politicization of the Paraguayan armed forces, the mode of transition was essentially irrelevant for understanding subsequent outcomes. As one author puts it, “If there were ever a case in which the old dictum ‘the more things change, the more they stay the same’ were appropriate, it would be Paraguay” (Mora 1998, 178).

As in the Bolivian case, the Peruvian armed forces left power largely as a result of internal divisions. Present, however, were the added factors of a politicized history as well as an immediate terrorist threat. Historically, Peruvian defense institutions have been weak, and when combined with a terrorist threat, such as the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas, have left the military with significant political influence that increased as they gained more latitude to fight the counterinsurgency war (Fitch 1998, 148). In the 1990s, they were active political players, even attempting to influence presidential elections by granting favored candidates access to military intelligence (Obando 1998). Military intelligence has been highly autonomous despite civilian efforts to rein in its activities, such as putting its former intelligence chief on trial.

Consequently, a persistent influence exists where a mode of transition argument would suggest greater civilian advances. Although some efforts were made in the 1980s to pass legislation that would roll back military prerogatives, presidents did not make those laws a priority, and so they often were not passed or were watered down. The guerrilla factor represents one of the confounding factors in using mode of transition as an explanatory variable, since it is impossible to know whether military prerogatives could have been scaled back in the absence of an identifiable threat to the state. As it turned out, the battle against Sendero allowed the Peruvian armed forces to demand greater autonomy and helped to prompt civilians to accede to the those demands.
Extrication and Pacted Transitions

Both extrication and pacts are less propitious transition paths for democratization. Extrication refers to military governments that make the decision on their own to hand power back to civilians. Control over the transition process and its aftermath, therefore, remain in the hands of the military leadership and civilians have little initial bargaining power or political leverage. In a pacted transition, the outgoing regime and civilians negotiate the transfer of power, with both sides making concessions—with, of course, variation across cases. What all such cases share is a military that leaves power in a position of strength. One of the most common concessions made by civilians is to accept the retention of codified military autonomy, which means that the emerging democracies are born with a “birth defect.”

In Brazil, the transition in 1985 was controlled by the military leadership, and the decision to leave power was made due to concerns about internal schisms and an increasingly autonomous intelligence service. No doubt existed, therefore, that the military was expected to maintain its prerogatives and to resist civilian encroachment on its interests. Yet Hunter (2001) argues that civilian bargaining power, especially in terms of using electoral strength to overcome military intransigence, has yielded greater advances in civilian supremacy than the “military-led” transition would have suggested. For example, the Cardoso administration created a civilian-led Ministry of Defense in 1998 despite years of military resistance to the idea.

Nonetheless, Brazil’s 1988 constitution retains the military’s role as the ultimate guardian of public order and, indeed, of the constitution itself. It also has broad control over the country’s intelligence agencies and even defacto autonomy when used for combating internal threats such as drug trafficking. As a consequence, “it appears that neither the Brazilian congress nor the president has reduced the extent of the military’s political influence” (Filho and Zirker 2000, 145). Furthermore, as Zaverucha (1998) puts it, “civilians formalized the military’s prerogatives constitutionally, giving the military’s sweeping powers a democratic veneer” (105-06).

In the Brazilian case, the mode of transition thesis holds up better than the electoral incentives argument. Nonetheless, unexpected empirical exceptions have occurred. These advances can be explained in large part by trade-offs that the military has made. More specifically, civilian advances in one area were accepted in return for a continuation of military autonomy and little civilian oversight in numerous other areas (Filho and Zirker 2000, 164). Although advances in the democratization of civil-military did, therefore, have a price, the fact that civilians have had even limited success cannot be
explained by the typical mode of transition argument.

Chile, meanwhile, is a case in which the military enjoyed enormous influence during the transition and had erected a complex constitutional-legal web to protect its institutional interests. The armed forces have routinely circumvented formal contacts when they believed their core interests were at stake, and postauthoritarian governments were consistently frustrated in their attempts at military reform (Weeks 2003). However, especially after the 1998 arrest of General Augusto Pinochet in Great Britain, the Chilean judicial system became more active in calling officers—even those on active-duty—to testify in human rights cases and, in some instances, to convict and imprison them.

Part of the reason for this new assertiveness was simply that by virtue of being arrested, even by a foreign power, Pinochet’s aura of invincibility had dissipated. However, this would not have been sufficient were it not for Chile’s noted history of an autonomous and active judicial system, along with its history of judicial reform. As far back as the 1920s and before the dictatorship, the judicial system was highly autonomous, with judges accountable only to the Supreme Court; in fact, Chileans prided themselves on their very legalistic society (Hilbink 1999). It became, therefore, the only institution related to the military that had contributed significantly to the democratization process.

In Ecuador we see virtually no exceptions to the predictions of the mode of transition argument, which coincides with a long history of military participation in politics and weak civilian governments. In the mid-1970s, the armed forces responded to pressures from civil society as well as from factions within the military by agreeing to a tightly controlled, long three-year transition to civilian rule. As part of this pacted transition, the military was guaranteed “substantial autonomy” that has not eroded over time (Fitch 1998, 63). In some areas, civilian authority actually decreased as the power of Congress to approve military promotions was eliminated. Since the late 1970s, then, the armed forces have played the role of political arbiter, removing presidents when they feel the need arises. Most prominently, in 1988 the army openly debated whether or not to stage a coup to prevent a populist candidate from winning, and in 2000 the military overthrew the elected president and quickly handed power to the vice president. The military thus plays a traditional “moderator” role in politics, stepping in if the military leadership believes political conflict has reached a critical point.

In Uruguay, we see a situation very similar to Chile’s, but without the presence of the high profile former dictator. The military entered the transition process in 1984 in a position of strength, albeit not as strong as it was in Chile,
where the military had successfully implemented its own constitution; the Uruguay military lost a plebiscite on the issue. In general, Uruguay is viewed as a successful case of military subordination to civilian rule. This assessment usually stems from the fact that the military has not opposed any postauthoritarian government and additionally enjoys little social or political support (Linz and Stepan 1996, 159). Extensive military autonomy remains, however, such as an impotent Ministry of Defense and weak congressional oversight. It is common for the military leadership to initiate its own activities without seeking authorization of civilian authorities. Of concern, though, are advances in areas not foreseen given the strong position of the armed forces at the moment of the transition, especially with regard to human rights processes in the courts. Uruguay has made much more progress than its neighbors in democratizing civil-military relations. Soon after the transition began, rumors of continued military intervention disappeared, military prerogatives were scaled back, and civilians began making policy almost entirely without military meddling.

Uruguay’s military had no history of intervention before the 1973 coup, and therefore, the establishment of relatively strong civil-military institutions proved easier than in countries without that history. It is, in fact, the only South American country with an historical legacy so propitious for civilian control of the armed forces. Certainly, by all accounts the Uruguayan armed forces show no signs of intervening directly in politics, yet a foundation of military prerogatives still stands. Although the pacted mode of transition did allow for military autonomy, the country’s history of civilian authority allowed, over time, for greater success than a mode of transition argument alone would predict.

Non-Transitions

Finally, Colombia and Venezuela are the two countries that have not suffered democratic breakdown for decades, and were widely considered civil-military success stories. For these reasons, they are less relevant to the mode of transition debate. However, by the 1990s Colombia’s armed forces were increasingly autonomous, brazen in violating human rights, and viewed civilian governments with distrust (Watson 2000). In Venezuela, the situation was even more serious, with coup attempts in 1992 and subsequently the rise to power of Hugo Chavez, who had spearheaded those failed efforts (Trinkunas 2002). Chavez himself was then very briefly toppled in 2002. The transition literature does not address these cases, since these countries did not recently experience military rule, but the cases are instructive because
they highlight how a historically prominent military role can become a problem even while civilian governments persist. In both countries, civil-military pacts date back to the mid-twentieth century when, after years of civil-military conflict, civilians co-opted military leaders in return for allegiance to civilian governments. In neither case were strong civil-military institutions constructed, and in the past decade the pacts have worn thin as socio-economic conditions have deteriorated. Thus, even after years of relative stability, the military has been asserting itself more often to the point of threatening regime change, especially in Venezuela.

Table A1 provides an outline of the transitions experienced in each South American country, using the Linz and Stepan (1996) model (see the Appendix). It also lists the political outcomes that would be expected in terms of the degree to which the new governments would likely be advancing civilian supremacy over the armed forces, along with the main empirical exceptions that have occurred.

**Conclusion**

This study offers only brief sketches, yet establishes the importance of bringing history back into analyses of political transitions in South America. To date, the study of the military's role in transitions has been hampered by an overemphasis on short-term factors, which in turn has resulted in unexpected empirical outcomes and the stalling of theory-building. Initial conditions are certainly important, and provide considerable insight into the military's role in the postauthoritarian era, yet as the transition recedes into the past, those conditions tell us less.

One of the greatest analytical risks of this approach is tautology. After the fact, any victory or defeat by civilians can be attributed to strength or weakness of the civil-military institution in question and the historical background of the military in each country. Further research must establish *a priori* the specific nature of historical legacies to better capture the variation among democratization outcomes. This article represents only a first analytical step. It is important not to return simply to the "multi-layered chess game" and instead investigate possible factors that have been ignored in order to come to conclusions that reflect empirical evidence more fully.

Unfortunately, one conclusion that becomes evident is that greater military influence is present than the transition literature would expect, regardless of the mode of transition, and civilian governments have remained circumspect and unwilling to risk a potential military response to attempts at democratic
reform in the area of civil-military relations. This suggests that region-wide histories of military autonomy and intervention have continued to represent obstacles on the road to democratization. Four of the ten countries in the region have experienced a coup attempt of some sort since 1990—Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela—and in all cases, albeit to differing degrees, the effort, even if unsuccessful, benefited the armed forces. In Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, popular dissatisfaction with civilian politicians has led to the election of former dictators or coup makers and serious political instability. In Paraguay a former coup plotter made a serious run at the presidency, and unstable government also has remained a major obstacle for democratization there.

Yet we must also keep in mind the critically important point that, despite obvious exceptions, civilian authority in the region has proved remarkably durable. Purely historical analyses would lead us to expect that the persistence of the military’s anti-political beliefs would preclude the achievement of civil-military stability. Despite the coup attempts, military rule has not returned to the region. Only a combination of transition mode and historical legacy explains the persistence of both military autonomy and civilian rule.

Despite the considerable analytical effort aimed at deciphering order from the events in different countries, confounding factors remain—guerrilla movements and drug trafficking among others—that can appear to represent a return to O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986) multi-layered chess game with seemingly infinite permutations and possibilities. The debate also remains over whether or not the transition paradigm remains a useful analytical tool. I would argue that the overall paradigm should be retained, but that it needs to go beyond its narrow focus on short-term factors. The Latin American history of military intervention and influence need not always repeat itself, but it must be taken into account.
## Appendix

### Table A.1 Modes of Transition in South America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mode of Transition</th>
<th>Expectation of Civilian Advances</th>
<th>Primary Empirical Exceptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Defeat in War/Regime Termination</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>Weak Civil-Military Institutions; uneven judicial success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia 1982</td>
<td>Regime Termination/ Pact</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Military has not been challenged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil 1985</td>
<td>Extrication</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Constitutional reform; creation of Defense Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile 1990</td>
<td>Pact</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Judicial success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Civil-Military discord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador 1979</td>
<td>Pact</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay 1989</td>
<td>Regime Termination</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Military has not been challenged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru 1980</td>
<td>Regime Termination</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Military has not been challenged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay 1984-85</td>
<td>Pact</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Judicial activism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Civil-Military breakdown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Watson, Cynthia. 2000. "Civil-Military Relations in Colombia: A Workable Relationship or a Case for Fundamental Reform?" 

