Sociopolitical Diversity in Psychology

The Case for Pluralism

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Psychology celebrates diversity, recognizes the value and legitimacy of diverse beliefs, and strives to be inclusive. Yet, the profession lacks sociopolitical diversity. Most psychologists are politically liberal, and conservatives are vastly underrepresented in the profession. Moreover, when sociopolitical views guide the research, advocacy, or professional practice of psychologists, those views most often are liberal. The lack of political diversity in psychology has unintended negative consequences for research, policy advocacy, clinical practice, the design and implementation of social interventions, and professional education. It excludes or marginalizes conservatives and conservative views, having detrimental effects on the profession in each of these areas. This article examines the importance of political diversity and the negative consequences of its absence and provides strategies for increasing sociopolitical pluralism in psychology.

Psychology celebrates cultural diversity, which has become one of the profession’s core values (see American Psychological Association [APA], 1992; Fowers & Richardson, 1996). By recognizing the value and legitimacy of diverse beliefs, psychology strives to be inclusive, and APA’s ethical principles urge psychologists to be sensitive to cultural differences. Moreover, “we have a central responsibility to examine our biases and the ways in which these biases contribute to perpetuating a particular political point of view” (Silverstein, 1993, p. 305). Despite these ideals, however, the profession lacks sociopolitical diversity; Conservatives and conservative views are vastly underrepresented in psychology. The lack of sociopolitical diversity is detrimental to psychology in ways that conflict with the profession’s core values and ethical principles. The lack of political diversity biases research on social policy issues, damages psychology’s credibility with policymakers and the public, impedes serving conservative clients, results in de facto discrimination against conservative students and scholars, and has a chilling effect on liberal education.

This article discusses these problems and presents four strategies for increasing sociopolitical pluralism in psychology. It is hoped that this article will generate a healthy, self-reflective debate on how the profession may be strengthened by enhancing its sociopolitical diversity.

The Conservative Absence

This article focuses on diversity in American psychology with respect to social policy issues, which often are at the forefront of the “culture wars” (e.g., Hunter, 1991). Conservative and liberal worldviews on such issues represent “two distinct conceptions of moral authority—two different ways of apprehending reality, of ordering experience, of making moral judgments” (Hunter, 1991, p. 128), which may be due to individual differences in views on human nature and the effective remedies for social problems (e.g., Hunt, 1999; Hunter, 1991; Tomkins, 1963), views on the extent to which individuals are responsible for their life circumstances (e.g., Weiner, 1995; Williams, 1984), intrinsic (e.g., reliance on individually defined moral truths) versus extrinsic (e.g., reliance on natural law or God) orientations to the sources of moral authority (e.g., Hunter, 1991, 2000), tough-mindedness versus tender-mindedness (e.g., Eysenck, 1954; Stone & Schaffner, 1988), and an orientation toward authoritarian–paternalistic versus egalitarian–nurturing family models (e.g., Lakoff, 1996; Milburn & Conrad, 1996).

If one accepts the common distinction between political liberalism and conservatism—with the former representing progressive values, an emphasis on communitarianism, and support for government-sponsored social welfare programs and the latter representing traditional values, an emphasis on self-reliance, and opposition to government welfare programs—it is safe to say that conservatives are vastly underrepresented in psychology. It is well documented that, like social scientists in general, both academic and practicing psychologists are much more liberal than the general population and most other professionals (see Lipset & Ladd, 1970; McClintock, Spaulding, & Turner, 1965; Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993). Psychology departments rank
either liberal or conservative. Coders were asked to judge whether the articles recognized traditional/status quo versus progressive/change-oriented themes or positions on social issues; advanced liberal versus liberal themes or positions on “culture wars” issues (e.g., abortion, affirmative action, welfare policy, crime-control, rights of gay individuals); advanced either anti- or pro-government involvement in, and spending on, welfare and social programs; were elitist/meritocracy-oriented versus egalitarian/social justice-oriented in their values; or favored capitalist/self-reliance versus socialist/communitarian values. With an intrater reliability of 93%, the raters judged that 97% of the articles advanced liberal themes or policies; only 1 of the 31 articles reflected more conservative views. The same analysis of articles appearing in the Journal of Social Issues (the banner publication of APA Division 9, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues) showed that 96% of the articles expressing political views were liberal. For example, the death penalty issue includes numerous articles opposing the death penalty but no articles supporting it, the grassroots organizing issue includes numerous articles about liberal group organizing but no articles about conservative group organizing, and the affirmative action issue includes many articles supporting affirmative action but no articles opposing it. Yet these are hotly debated social issues in the larger society about which there is considerable disagreement.

**The Problematic Consequences of Liberal Hegemony**

**Research Biases in Policy Research**

Psychologists who research social issues often have values invested in those issues (Maracek, Fine, & Kidder, 1997), and psychology’s liberal zeitgeist influences research on social problems. As so clearly illustrated by Ryan (1971) and Seidman (1983), how one defines a problem goes a long way in determining the proposed solution. “What one finds in psychological research often hinges on what one is looking for and how hard one looks” (Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993, pp. 249–250). If liberal questions are asked, one is likely to get liberal answers. One is unlikely to get conservative answers, however, if one fails to characterize problems from a conservative perspective. Science frequently is interpreted in a manner consistent with the values and beliefs of the scientists doing the research (see MacCoun, 1998; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1992; Unger, 1983, for reviews). As studies have shown, sociopolitical biases influence the questions asked, the research methods selected, the interpretation of research results, the peer review process, judgments about research quality, and decisions about whether to use research in policy advocacy (see S. 1. Abramowitz, Combs, & Abramowitz, 1975; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Mahoney, 1977; Miller & Pollack, 1994; Wilson, DePaulo, Mook, & Klaaren, 1993). The following examples illustrate how psychologists’ liberal sociopolitical values influence social policy research.

**Adolescent competence.** As an example of liberal bias affecting problem definition and the questions
researchers choose to address, consider research on adolescents’ legal competence. Psychologists have suggested two liberal but somewhat contradictory positions on whether adolescents are “competent”: (a) that adolescents should be allowed to make medical treatment decisions (e.g., abortion decisions) because they are “cognitively competent” to do so (e.g., Interdivisional Committee on Adolescent Abortion, 1987; Melton, 1983; Melton & Russo, 1987; Redding, 1993) and (b) that adolescents should not be tried or punished as adults because they are “immature” and thus not fully culpable for their crimes (e.g., Grisso, 1997; Redding, 1997b; see also Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995). By focusing on cognitive competence rather than the psychosocial maturity variables differentiating adult from adolescent judgment, researchers’ pro-choice position that adolescents should be afforded greater decision-making autonomy (see Melton, 1983) enabled researchers to favor the liberal conclusion that adolescents should be allowed to make certain medical treatment decisions without parental consent (see Redding, 1998; Scott et al., 1995). Yet focusing on psychosocial immaturity in the context of juveniles’ criminal culpability enabled psychologists to argue against conservative “get tough” on crime policies of adjudicating juveniles as adults (e.g., Grisso, 1997; Redding 1997b; see also Morse, 1997).

**Symbolic racism.** As an example of liberal bias affecting research methodology, consider research on symbolic racism (e.g., McConahay, 1986; Sears, 1988), which operationally defines and measures racism partly as a function of political attitudes toward policies like affirmative action, welfare, school busing, and “traditional American values, particularly individualism” (Kinder, 1986, p. 156). The research equates racism with political conservatism and traditional values (Tetlock, 1994). “Racists, according to this approach, are by definition conservatives, and conservatives, again by definition, are racists” (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986, p. 181). Sniderman and Tetlock invite us to consider “how the social science community would react to conservative researchers who operationalized their concept of symbolic Marxism with items that focused on support for the civil liberties of American communists or on opposition to aid to right-wing governments” (p. 182).1

**Gay and lesbian parenting.** As an example of liberal bias affecting research interpretation and its use in advocacy, consider researchers who advocate that parental sexual orientation should be irrelevant in child custody decisions (see Conger, 1977; Green & Bozett, 1991; Patterson & Redding, 1996). Much of the extant research finding no negative effects of gay parenting on children has serious limitations (e.g., small sample sizes, nonrepresentative and self-selected samples, reliance on self-reports subject to social desirability biases, and lack of longitudinal data) that are often downplayed by advocates, who also often fail to consider fully the potential importance of having both male and female nurturance and role models for children (see Belacasto, Gramlich, Nicholson, Price, & Wilson, 1993; Booth & Crouter, 1998; Robner, 1998; Wardle, 1997). The liberal bias also is evident in the interpretation of results (Belacasto et al., 1993; Wardle, 1997), with researchers sometimes “disregard[ing] their own results” (Belacasto et al., 1993, p. 117) suggesting negative effects of gay parenting on children’s development. To be sure, psychologists’ advocacy in this area is a response to status quo legal policies lacking empirical evidence for the assumptions that underlie them (Ball & Pea, 1998), but as Baumer (1995) pointed out, “It would be useful for . . . hypotheses positing deficits to be formulated by conservative, as well as liberal, scientists” (p. 135).

**The Bell Curve.** As an example of how conservatively oriented research may be held to a higher standard than research supporting liberal positions (Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993), consider the controversy surrounding The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1996). Because it espouses conservative sociopolitical views, The Bell Curve has been judged by many as “socially irresponsible” science, whose “pro-fascist” authors and funders lack personal and professional integrity (Kincheloe, Steinberg, & Gresson, 1996, pp. 41, 408–409). Holding research having significant implications for public policy, or implications with which the researcher disagrees, to higher or different standards of scientific proof poses dangers for the integrity of scientific research (Tetlock, 1994). “If when a study yields an unpopular conclusion it is subjected to greater scrutiny, and more effort is expended toward its refutation, an obvious bias to ‘find what the community is looking for will have been introduced’ ” (Loury, 1994, p. 142), as illustrated by the statement of one scholar who, with respect to research on gender differences in cognitive abilities, said, “I impose the highest standards of proof . . . on claims about biological inequality” (Fausto-Sterling, 1992, p. 11). Hereditarian views of intelligence have long been contentious because they tend to undercut egalitarian social policies. Those espousing such views have been subjected to withering personal attacks from colleagues, driving some to abandon intelligence research altogether (Gottfredson, 1999; Scarr, 1999). (For a disturbing account of the censorship by scientific journals of politically unpopular research, see Halpern, Gilbert, and Coren [1996].)

**Consequences of research bias.** The aforementioned cases are just a few examples illustrating how

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1 Consider also Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford’s (1950) The Authoritarian Personality, which characterized right-wing conservatives as having an authoritarian personality, and Altemeyer’s (1988) subsequent work on right-wing authoritarianism. Research using Adorno et al.’s F scale, a commonly used measure of authoritarianism, has consistently found that right-wing radicals score much higher in authoritarianism than left-wing radicals (see McClosky & Chong, 1985). But as Ray (1989) showed in his analysis of eight recent studies on authoritarianism, the studies are biased to favor the theory that conservatives are more likely than liberals to be authoritarian (see Suedfeld, in press). Items on the F scale are strongly oriented toward identifying right-wing, and not left-wing, authoritarians; McClosky and Chong’s study using left-wing as well as right-wing authoritarianism scales found authoritarianism in both ideological camps. For other examples of how construct definition and measurement are influenced by researchers’ liberal views, see Gilbert’s (1993) discussion of advocacy research on date and acquaintance rape and discussions of the liberal bias pervading much of political psychology and justice research (Tetlock, 1994; Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993; Suedfeld, in press).
psychologists’ liberal values “organize facts” (Rein, 1976, p. 250; see also Kunda, 1990). As several researchers have acknowledged, “Our reading of the scientific literature supports our political agenda” (Silverstein & Auerbach, 1999, p. 399). It is possible, of course, that psychology’s tenets may be overwhelmingly liberal yet accurate. In other words, the liberal worldview may be the correct one. To date, however, psychological research has been strongly biased toward validating the “flattering” psychological portrait of liberalism and the “unflattering” portrait of conservatism. Psychologists have not devoted the same attention to proposing, developing, and testing conservative perspectives on social issues as they have to liberal perspectives (Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993). A variety of mechanisms serve to reward conformity to dominant sociopolitical paradigms, including graduate training, the peer review and grant-award systems, professional awards and recognitions, and in-group influences among the variety of informal networks among professionals (Sternberg, 1998).

The failure to consider, develop, and test conservative ideas has invidious effects on intellectual honesty, creativity, and progress in scientific research (see Azar, 1997; Scarr, 1997). It also decreases the ecological validity of psychologists’ research. A culture’s common wisdom is a useful source for evaluating the ecological validity of psychological research, particularly social policy research (Redding, 1998). Because the sociopolitical wisdom of psychologists is skewed heavily toward the liberal perspective, we may not fully consider the common wisdom and concerns of the larger, more conservative society when we define social problems or conduct and evaluate research. Lacking political diversity, we maintain a dominant liberal discourse that may result in the biased evaluation or exclusion of conservative ideas as well as undue confidence in the validity of liberal paradigms, thus undermining the accuracy of our scientific theories and findings. Having discussed how the lack of political diversity affects research, the next sections discuss how it damages psychology’s credibility with policymakers and the public and serves to marginalize or exclude conservatives along with their values and ideas.

**Psychology’s Credibility in Question**

Organized psychology’s advocacy efforts have historically supported liberal political agendas (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1992), with the profession becoming increasingly politicized as APA’s advocacy efforts have expanded. Table 1 lists the policy positions adopted by the APA Council of Representatives since 1990 reflecting political views on contentious social issues in the so-called culture wars (see Hunter, 1991). All are liberal. Many of these policies lack sufficient scientific foundation (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1992), which may provide an example as to why psychology’s efforts to influence law and policy have not been as successful as many had hoped (see Redding, 1998).

The manifestly liberal stance of the profession undermines its credibility. Scientific findings are rendered suspect. For example, Senator Hatch (1982) questioned whether “psychologists want to move into a position where, ‘the findings of their research are now almost perfectly predictable from their political views’ ” (p. 1036; quoting Baron, 1981). As clearly shown in the results of a national survey of trial judges’ attitudes about social science research evidence (Redding & Reppucci, 1999), “judges may believe that the results of empirical research are unreliable, because they have been distorted by the scientists’ liberal values” (Tanford, 1990, p. 153). For instance, one federal judge complained that psychologists’ opinions in a school-testing discrimination case were “more the result of a doctrinaire commitment to a preconceived idea than they are the result of scientific inquiry” (Pase v. Hannon, 1980, p. 836).

**Whom Do We Serve?**

The lack of sociopolitical diversity in psychology may impede our ability to serve conservative clients. The value-laden nature of psychotherapy and social interventions has been well documented, with therapists’ sociopolitical values influencing clinical diagnosis, intervention, and treatment (see, e.g., Bayer, 1981; Cushman, 1995; Prillmetsky, 1990; Woolfolk, 1998). Studies have shown that a mismatch in therapist—client sociopolitical values may bias clinical judgment, even more so than differences in race, gender, or socioeconomic status (see C. V. Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977; Mazer, 1979). Gartner, Hartman, Larson, and Gartner (1990) presented case histories differing only in the client’s political—religious orientation to 363 clinical psychologists, who provided information on their own political orientation and rated their degree of empathy for the client. The ideological match between therapist and client affected therapists’ empathy for the client, with politically liberal therapists having less empathy for conservative clients (and vice versa). In addition, because a shifting process often occurs in therapy whereby the client’s values gravitate toward those of the therapist (Bergin, Payne, & Richards, 1996), there is the ethical concern that therapists may impose their liberal values on conservative clients (see Flanagan & Summers, 1986). Cushman (1995), for example, has advocated that psychotherapy should include discourses aimed at helping clients to understand how the moral status quo (e.g., consumerism or competitiveness) may be psychologically unhealthy.

Furthermore, treatment outcome research underscores the importance of understanding, appreciating, and empathizing with clients’ values, with a rough congruence in therapist—client values being key to therapeutic success (Bergin et al., 1996; Sue, 1998). The therapeutic bond, which is one of the most important determinants of treatment outcomes, is adversely affected when therapists’ and clients’ worldviews differ too greatly (Sue, 1998). In effect, psychology’s pervasive liberal zeitgeist may adversely affect treatment or program effectiveness with politically conservative clients and communities.

**De Facto Discrimination in the Educational Process**

The lack of political diversity may result in discrimination against conservative students and scholars. One of the most robust findings in social psychology is that people tend to have affinity for those sharing their attitudes and values and
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy statement</th>
<th>Summary of main policy position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social practices that induce violence (DeLeon, 1997, pp. 862–863)</td>
<td>Opposes social policies that promote violence, including firearms availability, underemployment, a punitive criminal justice system, and capital punishment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Firearm safety and youth (DeLeon, 1995, p. 674)</td>
<td>Supports nationwide licensing and regulation of firearms, including mandatory criminal background checks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gay and lesbian issues (DeLeon, 1994, pp. 628–629)</td>
<td>Opposes efforts by states to prohibit antidiscrimination legislation for gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on legal access to sterile injection equipment by drug users (DeLeon, 1993, p. 771)</td>
<td>Supports demonstration research on the legal availability of needles, which may prevent the spread of AIDS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution on lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth in the schools (DeLeon, 1993, pp. 781–783)</td>
<td>Supports providing a secure school atmosphere for gay and bisexual youth and interventions fostering nondiscrimination that address the needs of these youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense policy on sexual orientation and advertising in APA publications (Fox, 1992, p. 927)</td>
<td>Opposes the Department of Defense’s policy of discriminating against homosexuals. APA takes a leadership role in seeking to change this policy and will prohibit Department of Defense advertising in APA publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution on the Rust v. Sullivan Supreme Court decision (Fox, 1992, pp. 927–928)</td>
<td>Opposes the “gag rule” that prohibits health care providers who receive federal Title X funds from informing female patients about alternatives to abortion.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution on substance abuse by pregnant women (Fox, 1992, pp. 928–929)</td>
<td>Opposes laws and policies treating alcohol and drug abuse as a criminal justice matter and opposes punitive actions against women who abuse chemical substances while pregnant.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution on homelessness (Fox, 1991, p. 720)</td>
<td>Supports increased public spending to rehouse homeless individuals and provide supportive and preventative services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opposition to English-only initiative (Fox, 1991, p. 723)</td>
<td>Opposes English-only laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological issues in the abortion debate (Fox, 1990, p. 843)</td>
<td>Opposes efforts to recriminalize abortion or limit reproductive options. Encourages efforts to educate the public about research findings showing no negative psychological effects of abortion.</td>
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* Citations are to the proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Incorporated, appearing in the American Psychologist. Each year’s proceedings report the council resolutions passed in the previous year.

often dislike those whose values differ too much from their own (Byrne et al., 1975; Rosenbaum, 1986), and an important dimension along which we judge others is the degree to which their sociopolitical values match our own (Rokeach, 1960, 1973). The only available empirical study (Gartner, 1986) suggests discrimination in graduate school admissions. Professors in APA-approved clinical psychology departments were sent graduate student applications (including grade point average, Graduate Record

2 In Lakoff’s (1996) cognitive modeling of conservative and liberal worldviews, he illustrated the strong negative stereotypes that each group often holds of the other, as did Hunter (1991) in his sociological analysis of the culture wars. Indeed, some studies have suggested that sociopolitical bias may be as strong as, or stronger than, racial or ethnic bias (see Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hopp, 2000; Hyland, 1974; Rokeach & Mezri, 1966; Rokeach, Smith, & Evans, 1960). “Belief in a common vision of reality, or rather a shared, social construction of reality, may be a far more potent social glue than the color of one’s skin, cultural heritage, or gender” (Shafrauske & Maloney, 1996, p. 564).
Examination scores, and a personal statement) that differed only in whether the applicant volunteered that he was a conservative Christian. Professors rated the nonconservative applicant significantly higher in all areas: Professors had fewer doubts about his abilities, felt more positively about his ability to be a good psychologist, and rated him as more likely to be admitted to their graduate program. Because the mock applicants had identical academic qualifications, the findings suggest an admissions bias against religious conservatives, which violates APA’s ethical principles and antidiscrimination laws (Gartner, 1986).

There is a probable selection effect among those entering graduate school, as well as de facto discrimination in faculty hiring (see Cheney, 1995; Nisbet, 1997). Professions and organizations tend to select those who share their values (see Cable & Judge, 1997). An academic department “will decide whose conversations it finds interesting, helpful, or illuminating” (Levinson, 1988, p. 178). With social science disciplines demanding “at least a rough allegiance to a leftist perspective as qualification for membership in the faculty” (Gross & Levitt, 1994, p. 34), “a certain politics [is] simply assumed” (Dickstein, 1994, p. 43). People often opt out of careers that they later discover to be inconsistent with, or unsupportive of, their values. Perhaps this is why there are so few conservatives in psychology, with the prevailing liberalism being a strong disincentive for prospective graduate students and professors who are conservative (Gross & Levitt, 1994). They have few role models in the profession (and few like-minded colleagues with whom to collaborate vis-à-vis research on social issues), and conservatives may feel, rightly or wrongly, that their professional success is dependent on staying in the political closet. Particularly in applied disciplines of psychology (e.g., clinical, community, and applied social) in which sociopolitical issues often are the subject of inquiry, the discrepancy between conservative values and those of the liberal sociopolitical majority in psychology will be salient for conservatives. This may decrease their likelihood of educational success and later job satisfaction (see Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999). Minority status produces feelings of psychological distinctiveness that may negatively affect job satisfaction (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Niemann & Dovidio, 1998).

The lack of political diversity also has a chilling effect on liberal education. Conservative sociopolitical views are not nearly represented in the psychology curriculum to the same extent as liberal views, which often are expressly incorporated into curricular materials (Bergin, 1983). One community psychology text (Duffy & Wong, 1996), for example, explicitly criticizes Reagan–Bush social policies while praising Clinton policies. Another leading text (Lavine & Perkins, 1997) concludes with a liberal critique of the Republican “Contract With America.” The liberal bias in curricular materials makes it difficult for students to distinguish between science and politics and deprives students of a true liberal arts education, which should expose students to differing political perspectives on social issues. Although conservative views may be readily accessible to students outside of the academy, the issue is whether conservative perspectives are given voice in the classroom, particularly by professors.

In addition, political self-censorship operates to limit academic freedom and stifle classroom debate, particularly when negative attributions are assigned to those espousing unpopular views (see Halpern et al., 1996; Loury, 1994). Rokeach (1960) observed that closed-mindedness exists among liberal academics who espouse tolerance but do not practice it with regard to conservative views and those who hold them (see also Fish, 1999). To succeed in academia, conservatives feel that they must accommodate to the liberal views of their professors or colleagues and that the academic climate is often hostile to their politics (see Cheney, 1995; D’Souza, 1991; Kimball, 1990; Rauch, 1993; Sacks & Thiel, 1995), which may make them hesitant to express their views (Loury, 1994).

**Strategies for Increasing Sociopolitical Diversity**

As I have demonstrated, the pervasive liberal zeitgeist in psychology affects our roles and contributions as researchers, policy advocates, clinicians, and educators. Do we want a professional world where our liberal worldview prevents us from considering valuable strengths of conservative approaches to social problems; where the public and policymakers dismiss our research and advocacy because it is seen as too intertwined with our political beliefs; where psychologists fail to appreciate the phenomenology and values of conservative clients and communities; or where conservatives are reluctant to enter the profession, and we tacitly discriminate against them if they do so? Psychology’s core values and ethical principles would answer these questions in the negative. I wish to suggest, then, four strategies that may increase political diversity in psychology. Each of these strategies is discussed below.

**Explore Conservative Alternatives**

Liberal and conservative paradigms each have important and unique contributions to offer.

A psychology that merely echoes the received wisdom of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party (or any other orthodoxy) will not succeed by the standards of scientific endeavor . . . because we claim—in our journals, in our classrooms, in our conversations with those who wield power—to represent a self-correcting scientific community. (Tetlock, 1994, pp. 515, 528)

We must question the liberal wisdom of our profession, challenge its assumptions, and explore conservative alternatives, not because the liberal wisdom is necessarily incorrect, but because it is incomplete. In so doing, we also help protect against politically biased research. Lord, Lupper, and Preston (1984) found a debiasing effect when psychology students considered whether their evaluation of research would have been the same had it produced the opposite result, as did Brenner, Koehler, and Tversky (1996) when students evaluated the strength of opposing arguments. (For an example of a systematic application of this approach, see Tetlock [1994].)
Tribe (1972) suggested that alternative views be identified and fleshed out at each iteration in research design and policy analysis. Toward this end, Tetlock and Mitchell (1993) put forth a taxonomy of the sociopolitical assumptions inherent in social policy research. They proposed “as a corrective to [the] ideological tunnel vision” (Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993, p. 235) inherent in psychology’s liberal bias, that researchers systematically test hypotheses derived from each of the sociopolitical models in their 2 (conservative vs. liberal) × 2 (flattering vs. unflattering psychological portraits of each political perspective) × 2 (cognitive vs. motivational aspects of the portraits) taxonomy. Researchers can use the taxonomy as a guide for formulating and testing hypotheses, including those flowing from the “flattering” portrait of conservatism and the “unflattering” portrait of liberalism.

Some may argue, however, that psychology’s task is to challenge traditional assumptions, thereby making it unnecessary to explore or develop conservative views, which represent a status quo in society that already is reified in psychology (see D. R. Fox, 1993; Prilleltensky, 1994; Sampson, 1993). (Note that many conservatives, however, view the status quo as too liberal.) Those arguing that psychology is not liberal or radical enough, however, find little comfort in the fact that psychology is far more liberal than the American polity and ignore that worthwhile change comes from the right as well as the left. But rather than setting out to challenge or affirm traditional versus nontraditional assumptions, psychologists should test all assumptions against data and relevant theory.

**Expand the Domain of Diversity**

In my view, we should consider sociopolitical values to be a key component of cultural diversity (see Bergin et al., 1996). Sociopolitical beliefs reflect people’s deeply held core values and moral beliefs (see Hunter, 1991; Kerlinger, 1984; Lakoff, 1996; Tomkins, 1963), and APA’s ethical principles urge psychologists to be sensitive to cultural differences (APA, 1992). A definition of cultural diversity that incorporates sociopolitical values, however, necessitates the empowerment of conservatives in the profession. Because “empowerment is not a scarce resource which gets used up” (Rappaport, 1987, p. 142), empowering conservatives does not mean we disempower others. Insofar as sociopolitical values are concerned, conservatives are a vastly underrepresented and marginalized minority in psychology. This is incompatible with our respect for diversity and a host of other ethical principles. We should emphasize the strengths of the (conservative) “other” and critically evaluate how we may unwittingly contribute to their oppression, even when that oppression is unintended, subtle, or tacit.

To increase diversity in psychological research and practice, the profession should take steps to overcome the disincentives and de facto discrimination that may prevent conservatives from entering the profession. A critical mass of conservative psychologists is necessary to provide a supportive environment comfortably allowing for the exploration and development of conservative views (see Niemiec, 1996). We should reach out to conservatives in graduate student recruiting and faculty hiring. Perhaps affirmative-action-like practices should be instituted. Although this may seem like an odd, even disingenuous proposal, given that conservatives generally disfavor affirmative action practices, it would benefit the profession by increasing its intellectual diversity (see Cox & Blake, 1991; Nemeth, 1986, 1994). As Justice Powell pointed out, diversity brings “experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of [students] and better equip…. graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity” (Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1978, p. 320). Minority influences stimulate creativity, novel and divergent thinking, consideration of alternatives, deep as opposed to shallow cognitive processing (Cox & Blake, 1991; Nemeth, 1986, 1994), and behavioral variation stimulating adaptation and change (Colerell, 1998). It is also possible that, under the appropriate circumstances, negative stereotypes of conservatives may be ameliorated through direct and continuous interaction with conservatives and their viewpoints (see Nemeth, 1986; Pettigrew, 1997).

**Enrich the Curriculum**

With the persuasive power that professors have over their students and the ethical duty to be pedagogically objective and even-handed (APA, 1992; Friedlich & Douglass, 1998) comes the obligation to foster students’ engagement with liberal as well as conservative (or status quo) political views. Engagement with multiple perspectives fosters critical thinking, produces more complex reasoning styles and attitudes (Kitchener & King, 1994), and facilitates values clarification, moral development, and social responsibility (see Grube, Mayton, & Ball-Rokeach, 1994; May, 1996). When students seek to integrate opposing views, it enhances perspective taking and information seeking, improves understanding and decision-making quality, and creates attitude change (Johnson, Brooker, Stutzman, Hultman, & Johnson, 1985). In the classroom, we need a true dialectic that examines and challenges liberal and conservative perspectives on social issues. (For an excellent example in psychology, see Suedfeld and Tetlock [1992].) When studying social problem definition, for example, students might consider Ryan’s (1971) Blaming the Victim alongside Sykes’s (1992) A Nation of Victims: The Decay of the American Character, which critiques the social policy implications of Ryan’s view. Given the lack of politically conservative readings in psychology, instructors may need to seek sources from relevant social science disciplines such as political science, economics, public policy, or law.

**Separate Science From Advocacy**

Psychologists should engage in advocacy qua psychologists only when there is strong empirical evidence bearing on the social policy issue in question (see Redding, 1998). For example, to the extent that child custody laws are grounded in empirically false assumptions about the negative effects of gay parenting, psychologists have an im-
important role to play in bringing relevant research to policymakers’ attention (see Patterson & Redding, 1996). But to the extent that these laws are based on moral views about homosexuality, psychologists have no role to play qua psychologists because psychology can neither validate nor invalidate moral beliefs. Consider advocacy for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Research showing the harmful effects of discrimination, along with psychology’s collective value of respecting human dignity, leads many psychologists to the conclusion that APA should oppose discrimination. But as acknowledged by the APA Council of Representatives when it passed a resolution supporting the ERA, “[t]he ERA is a matter of human rights rather than of scientific fact” (APA, 1988, p. 59). In endorsing particular social policies, we may exploit our professional status by creating the impression that psychological science has identified the most appropriate means for achieving desired social ends; otherwise, we would not undertake advocacy qua psychologists (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1992). We also commit what philosophers call the naturalistic fallacy—deriving a moral “ought” from an empirical “is” by conflating values with “scientific facts” (Kendler, 1993). Melton (1990) committed the naturalistic fallacy in arguing that “psychological jurisprudence” dictates certain moral-political positions such as opposition to Judge Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court, as did Lakoff (1996) in arguing that empirical developmental psychology supports liberal social policies (see Redding, 1997a). Although the naturalistic fallacy principle is not accepted by all (see Pflaum & Volgeltanz, 1994), “abiding by the implications of the naturalistic fallacy enables psychology to gain its freedom from those who use it for their own political goals” (Kendler, 1996, p. 28).

In general, policymakers need “information and analyses which cover the waterfront and which are as objective and value-neutral as humanly possible” (Streib, 1988, p. 257). As an ideal, this is never wholly attainable given the inseparability of science and values, but we can and should make efforts to distinguish between scientific knowledge and our political views. We have an ethical obligation not to go beyond our expertise, particularly in view of psychology’s increasing impact on society (Prillettensky, 1994). Judge Bazelon, recognized as probably one of the more liberal judges ever to sit on the federal bench, urged psychologists to disclose their biases and “acknowledge the existence of alternative hypotheses and explanations” (Bazelon, 1982, p. 119, quoting ethical guidelines of APA, 1981). In the same way, deciding whether research is sufficiently reliable for dissemination to policymakers is a judgment call that should not be driven by the political agenda of researchers.

Conclusion

Sociopolitical values should be included under the rubric of cultural diversity. We should encourage conservatives to join our ranks and foster a true sociopolitical dialogue in our research, practice, and teaching. It is in our self-interest to do so. “We pay a terrible price that is a consequence of partisan narrow-mindedness” (Sarason, 1986, p. 905). Political narrowness and insularity do not invigorate a discipline but limit and deaden it. But increasing political diversity will require second-order change in the profession. We must examine our political biases and their effects on our work. Do we implicitly or explicitly dismiss, marginalize, or stereotype conservative views and those who hold them? Of course, no area of human inquiry is free of implicit assumptions and ideology, but there is a difference between politics writ large and politics writ small. We cannot escape the latter because ideology is inescapable. Rather, it is a question of giving equal time to opposing views and of openness to true diversity in sociopolitical thought. Conservative views must be sayable (comfortably so), seriously considered, and seen as respectable alternative perspectives. An abundance of diverse views is preferable for education and scholarship, clinical practice, and professional integrity.

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